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I. INTRODUCTION
During the early morning hours of December 3, 1984, a poisonous
chemical' escaped from the Union Carbide2 plant in Bhopal,3 India,
causing the deaths of at least 1,700 Indian citizens and injuring over
200,000 others. 4 Many of these victims lived in shanty towns just
outside the gates of the Bhopal plant.5 The victims paid little attention
to the sound of the plant's emergency siren on the morning of the
leak because the plant used this same siren regularly to signal changes
in work shifts. 6 As the siren sounded aimlessly in the night, a cloud
of suffering and death enveloped the unsuspecting victims.
The chemical was methyl isocyanate (MIC), used by Union Carbide to man-
ufacture pesticides. Bhopal: City of Death, INDiA TODAY, Dec. 31, 1984, at 6, col.
2. Humans exposed to the chemical may suffer eye irritations, shortness of breath,
wheezing and coughing, and other respiratory difficulties. When breathed in large
amounts, MIC can be fatal. Kramer, For Bhopal Survivors, Recovery is Agonizing,
Illnesses are Insidious, Wall St. J., Apr. 1, 1985, at 14, col. 2.
2 Union Carbide is a multinational corporation headquartered in Danbury, Con-
necticut. Bhopal: City of Death, supra note 1, at 10. Union Carbide, primarily a
producer of batteries, photoengraving equipment, and marine products, opened its
Bhopal subsidiary in 1969 for the production of pesticides. The Indian Government
encouraged Union Carbide to locate the plant in Bhopal because technology in the
Indian pesticide industry remained underdeveloped, and the nation sought to become
self-sufficient in food production. Pesticide Plant Started as a Showpiece but Ran
into Troubles, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1985, at 8, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Pesticide
Plant]. For further discussion on the beginning of the Union Carbide plant in
Bhopal, see infra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
I "Bhopal is the capital of Madhya Pradesh, the largest and one of the most
economically depressed of India's 22 states." Pesticide Plant, supra note 2, at 8,
col. 1.
4 Lewin, Carbide is Sued in U.S. by India in Gas Disaster, N.Y. Times, Apr.
9, 1985, at D2, col. 2. The earliest unofficial reports stated that as many as 2,000
deaths had occurred. Bhopal officials so far have confirmed only 1,700 deaths, but
have indicated that efforts are being continued to investigate other possible gas-
related deaths. Id. In addition, recent surveys from Bhopal indicate that 500 to
1,000 others have died in the last year as a result of the accident. These additional
deaths have been caused by general failing health related to exposure to the leaking
gas, as well as by infections such as pneumonia. Diamond, Lasting Health Damage
Laid to Chemical Leaked in India, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1985, at 1, col. 2. Officials
have also estimated that 200,000 people have been injured by the gas, many of them
permanently. Kramer, supra note 1, at 1, col. 1.
Some Bhopal officials, however, refute that only 1,700 deaths resulted from the
accident. Raj Kumar Bisarya, mayor of Bhopal at the time of the disaster, estimates
the total number dead at 3,000. H.S. Billa, superintendent of the Bhopal police
station, says the toll was "about 7,000 minimum, 10,000 maximum." Kramer, supra
note 1, at 14, col. 1.
I Reinhold, Disaster in Bhopal: Where Does Blame Lie?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31,
1985, at A8, col. 2.
6 Slum Dwellers Unaware of Danger, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1985, at A8, col.
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The Bhopal disaster is the most significant recent example of United
States industry injuring foreign victims.' The accident involved Indian
citizens and a local subsidiary of a large manufacturer based in the
United States.8 The case, therefore, raises many issues that must be
resolved when foreign plaintiffs attempt to bring mass tort claims in
courts of the United States.
Among the most important issues in the case is whether a foreign
sovereign may sue in the United States as the sole representative of
its victims under the doctrine of parens patriae,9 and whether a parent
company based in the United States will be held responsible for
actions of its foreign subsidiary.' 0 Other issues include whether a
United States court accepting jurisdiction should apply United States
law or the law of the country in which the accident occurred," and
whether foreign plaintiffs will be properly compensated if the Amer-
ican-based corporation files for bankruptcy. 2
Although these questions are important in the Bhopal case, the
1. One shantytown resident said, "[wle used to hear sirens often. We thought it
was routine." Id.
Other examples include the Dalkon Shield which A.H. Robins produced and
sold worldwide, Robins Runs for Shelter, Turin, Sept. 2, 1985, at 32, col. 1, and
Oraflex, a medicine produced for arthritis, manufactured by American-based Eli
Lilly, and marketed since 1980 in Great Britain and eight other countries. Side
Effects for a Pain Killer, TnAE, Sept. 2, 1985, at 33. Oraflex was a factor in the
deaths of over 70 people outside of the United States. Id.
I The Danbury, Connecticut-based parent company owns 50.9% of its Indian
subsidiary's equity, and has veto power over many of its policies and practices.
Bhopal. City of Death, supra note 1, at 10, col. 2. Union Carbide India Limited
(UCIL), which operates the Bhopal plant as well as plants in eight other Indian
cities, is among the top 20 of India's most profitable companies. Id. at 17, col. 1.
The Bhopal compound has remained closed since the accident, and Union Carbide
officials have barred outsiders from the site. Weisman, Bhopal Factory a Year Later:
Silence and Weeds, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1985, at A10, col. 1.
For a brief discussion of the Indian Government's actions which led to its self-
appointment as sole representative of the victims, see infra notes 53-56 and accom-
panying text. See also, Westbrook, Theories of Parent Company Liability and the
Prospects for an International Settlement, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 321, 330 (1985).
,o See Westbrook, supra note 9, at 321.
" The choice of law question in the Bhopal litigation is discussed briefly in infra
notes 177-94 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the choice of law in
transnational events, see generally Hadari, Choice of National Law Applicable to
the Multinational Enterprise and the Nationality of Such Enterprises, 1974 DnE
L.J. 1; Park, International Products Liability Litigation: Choosing the Applicable
Law, 12 INT'L LAW. 845 (1978); Reese, American Trends in Private International
Law: Academic and Judicial Manipulation of Choice of Law Rules in Tort Cases,
33 VAND. L. REv. 717 (1980).
1 See generally Westbrook, supra note 9, at 328-29 (discussing the possibility
that Union Carbide India might file for bankruptcy in the United States).
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court will not consider any question prior to resolving the critically
significant venue issue. This threshold issue concerns whether a United
States court lacks jurisdiction over any case arising from the gas leak
accident based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens.13 This
common law doctrine allows a United States court to dismiss a case
when the defendant can show great inconvenience in the present
forum and the availability of an adequate alternative forum. 4
Thus, to argue the doctrine of forum non conveniens successfully,
Union Carbide must show great inconvenience in having the Bhopal
claims litigated in the United States, and must further show that
India represents an adequate alternative forum for the claims."5
13 In 1984, Congress enacted the statutory counterpart to the common law doctrine
of forum non conveniens. This statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), allows a district court
to transfer a civil action to another district court or division where the case could
have originally been brought. The statute states that a court may transfer "[flor
the convenience of parties and witnesses, [or] in the interest of justice." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) (1982). Beginning with the enactment of this statute, courts have limited
the doctrine of forum non conveniens to situations in which the defendant seeks to
transfer a case to a foreign court, or seeks removal from a state court to a federal
court. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 44, at 259-60 (4th ed. 1983).
In the Bhopal case, the defendant seeks to have the case dismissed, which would
require re-filing the case in India. In this instance, forum non conveniens, not §
1404(a), applies because the case involves removal to a foreign forum. Two main
differences between forum non conveniens and a § 1404(a) transfer exist: first, in
a forum non conveniens motion, the court will completely dismiss a case, whereas
under § 1404(a), the case will be transferred to another court; second, if the court
grants a forum non conveniens motion, the new forum will apply its own law, while
under § 1404(a), the transferee court will apply the law of the transferor court. Id.
at 261. Because of the severity of dismissing a case under forum non conveniens,
as opposed to transfer under § 1404(a), the Supreme Court has stated that a lower
court can order a § 1404(a) transfer based on a lesser showing of inconvenience
than would justify dismissal under forum non conveniens. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick,
349 U.S. 29 (1955).
1 C. WRIGHT, supra note 13, § 44, at 259. For further discussion of the application
of forum non conveniens in cases involving foreign citizens, see generally Devel-
opment, Forum Non Conveniens: Limiting Access to Federal Courts for Transnational
Disputes, 10 DEN. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 379 (1981); Note, Convenient Forum Abroad
Revisited: A Decade of Development of the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in
International Litigation in the Federal Courts, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 755 (1977); Note,
Forum Non Conveniens and Foreign Plaintiffs: Addressing the Unanswered Questions
of Reyno, 6 FoRDwAs INT'L L.J. 577 (1983); Note, Forum Non Conveniens: Standards
for the Dismissal of Actions From United States Federal Courts to Foreign Tribunals,
5 FoPRDHAm INT'L L.J. 533 (1982).
" If the court grants the forum non conveniens motion, all suits in the United
States will be dismissed and will most likely be moved to India. If the claims are
not filed again in India, they will never be heard. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno, 454 U.S. 233, 235-37 (1981). If the court denies the motion, however, Union
Carbide will probably attempt to convince the district court judge to certify the
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The forum non conveniens issue is critical because the Indian victims
are very likely to receive a substantially lower damage award if an
Indian, rather than a United States, court hears the case.' 6 Indian
courts do not award punitive damages, and Indian judges have con-
sistently given small damage awards in personal injury and wrongful
death cases. 17 In addition, Indian courts base damage awards on the
Indian standard of living, which is substantially lower than in the
United States.18
This Note supports the proposition, however, that although damage
awards for the victims would be higher if a United States court heard
the claims, India has the greatest interest in the case 9 and represents
a fully adequate forum for the Bhopal litigation. The Note proposes
that liability for the accident can sufficiently be established under
India's existing body of tort law, 20 and, additionally, that India's
procedural law is capable of providing each victim a fair and just
trial.2' The Note shows that because differences between United States
issue for immediate appellate review. Under the Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958,
a trial judge may state in writing that an order involves a controlling question of
law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion, and that
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination
of the litigation. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982). A forum non conveniens motion may
be certified for interlocutory review under § 1292(b). The appellate court may then
agree or decline to hear the case the district court has certified under § 1292(b). C.
WRIGHT, supra note 13, § 102, at 713-15.
16 Although no one can be certain what amount an Indian or an American court
would award, cases in both jurisdictions indicate that a United States jury would
grant far greater damage awards than an Indian judge. For example, punitive damages
do not exist in India, see infra notes 145-47 and accompanying text. Any award of
punitive damages in an American court would significantly increase the total award.
In addition, American courts base damages on a standard of living much higher
than the standard of living in many foreign jurisdictions. See Brice, Forum Shopping
in International Air Accident Litigation: Disturbing the Plaintiff's Choice of an
American Forum, 7 B.C. INT'L & Comia. L. REV. 31, 39-40 (1984) [hereinafter cited
as Forum Shopping].
,1 The pattern of damage awards given in India is discussed in infra notes 137-
57 and accompanying text.
See generally Forum Shopping, supra note 16, at 40, n.86.
'9 For a discussion of the overwhelming Indian interests in the Bhopal litigation,
see infra notes 309-14 and accompanying text.
I The substantive tort law of India, as applied to the Bhopal case, is discussed
in infra notes 79-136 and accompanying text.
21 This is especially true since the Indian Government has waived the usual court
fees for any claims arising out of the accident, see infra notes 196-203 and accom-
panying text, and considering the possibility that a special tribunal of judges solely
responsible for the Bhopal claims could be established if the claims were heard in
India. See infra note 222 and accompanying text.
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and Indian law are largely cultural and sociological, a United States
court should not recognize these differences as an adequate basis for
jurisdiction. The Note concludes, therefore, that the Indian plaintiffs
do not need the paternalistic protection of a United States court
when an Indian court can equitably award these plaintiffs according
to cultural standards of their homeland.
The Note begins in Section II, which discusses the background of
the disaster and the legal actions taken thus far in the case. Section
III compares the Indian and American forums according to sub-
stantive tort law, patterns of damage awards, and certain procedural
distinctions. Section IV considers the forum non conveniens issue,
along with Indian and American interests in the case. The Note
concludes by projecting that the substantial Indian interests in the
case, combined with the adequacy of the Indian forum, mandates
dismissal of those claims brought by Indian plaintiffs in the United
States.
II. THE BHOPAL CASE
The Union Carbide. Corporation is the thirty-seventh largest com-
pany in the United States; world-wide the company is the seventh
largest in the chemical industry. 2 In 1969, Union Carbide purchased
a five-mile tract of land in the northeastern quarter of Bhopal, India
to house the Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) pesticide plant.23
Housing units quickly were developed around the new plant, 24 and
by 1981 the city had doubled in size to 700,000.25
Initially, the UCIL plant imported pure sevin, a pesticide, and
diluted and packaged it for sale. Gradually the company began to
add pilot factories to produce pesticides. 26 The first project, begun
22 Bhopal: City of Death, supra note 1, at 21. As a conglomerate, the Union
Carbide Corporation has $10 billion in assets which a judgment against the cor-
poration would expose. Diamond, Pleas on Bhopal Trial Heard, N.Y. Times, Jan.
4, 1986, at 41, col. 6.
13 Pesticide Plant, supra note 2, at 8, col. 1. The original five-mile tract quickly
grew to include 80 acres. Id. Bhopal was an attractive sight for several reasons: (1)
Bhopal is in the center of India and is a good base for transporting products to
India's large cities; (2) the upper lake provided an ample supply of water to use in
producing chemicals at the plant; and (3) Bhopal was one of the few areas in India
without an electricity shortage. Id. at 8, col. 2.
24 Reinhold, supra note 5, at A8, col. 2. Both government-sanctioned housing
and unauthorized slums were constructed. Id.
25 Pesticide Plant, supra note 2, at 8, col. 1.
6 Id. at 8, col. 3. "Initially the plant was chiefly a finishing, or formulation,
plant for raw pesticides imported from other areas, [and] there was no methyl
isocyanate." Id. at 8, cols. 2-3.
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in 1971, was designed to produce alphanaphthol, a chemical related
to mothballs, and mix it with imported MIC to make sevin.27 In
1977, UCIL began construction on a $2.5 million plant designed to
produce alphanaphthol in Bhopal. 28 The Union Carbide parent com-
pany approved the plans and design for the new plant. 29 After closing
once for modifications, the MIC plant began production in 1980.30
The MIC leak which caused the 1984 disaster probably began as
the result of a runaway reaction of the MIC with water.3 Pressure
in the MIC tank forced open its safety valve; each of the five other
safety systems designed to prevent such a leak failed.12 When MIC
escaped from the plant and settled over Bhopal and outlying areas,
it destroyed the lung tissue of persons inhaling large amounts, killing
them in minutes. For others, the chemical resulted in eye irritations,
nausea, vomiting, chest pains, and breathing difficulties.33 Many vic-
tims still experienced asthma-like symptoms months after the acci-
dent.3 4 The long-term effects of the leak, which may surface in months
to come, include fibrosis, a fatal form of bronchitis, and mental
retardation in young babies yet unborn at the time of the accident.35
17 Id. at 8, col. 3.
21 Id. at 8, col. 4.
29 Union Carbide supplied the Indian affiliate with the overall design for the
plant, and one Carbide engineer stated in an affidavit that he had approved the
design by tracing "every line, every valve, every instrument" when the plant began
operations. Diamond, Discrepancies Are Seen In Bhopal Court Papers, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 3, 1986, at D3, col. 2. The plaintiffs have argued that not only did Union
Carbide exercise control over the Bhopal plant by providing designs for the plant,
but also that Union Carbide defectively designed the plant, and the company is
therefore liable for the design defects regardless of what happened in India. Adler,
Carbide Plays 'Hardball, AM. LAW. 27, 58 (Nov. 1985).
30 Pesticide Plant, supra note 2, at 8, cols. 4-5.
3 According to several employees, the leak started when a supervisor ordered an
unqualified worker to wash out a pipe that had not been properly sealed. The water
from this process was the likely contaminant of the MIC. Even after discovering
the leak, the supervisor "decided to deal with it only after the next tea break."
Diamond, The Bhopal Disaster: How it Happened, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1985, at
Al, col 3; see also Bhopal: City of Death, supra note 1, at 7-8. But see Hypothesis
on the Cause, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1985, at A6, col. 1.
32 For an explanation of the safety systems not working at the time of the accident,
see Bhopal: City of Death, supra note 1, at 8-10.
13 Bhopal: City of Death, supra note 1, at 15.
14 One study suggests that lung inflammation caused by the inhalation of MIC
may not subside for at least two or three years. The study also concluded that some
victims may have permanently scarred lung tissue which would hamper breathing
for life. Diamond, supra note 4, at 18, col. 3.
11 Kramer, supra note 1, at 14, col. 2. Since the MIC leak, 366 pregnant women
who inhaled the gas have experienced spontaneous abortions. According to Dr.
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American lawyers began arriving in Bhopal within a week of the
accident.3 6 These lawyers used retainer forms to enlist thousands of
"clients ' 3 7 injured by the MIC leak.3" Although the exodus by many
American lawyers to Bhopal angered some,3 9 others felt the disaster
would have gone unnoticed without the influence of these lawyers. 40
One problem the retainer forms present is the possibility of mul-
tiplicity of representation. In all likelihood, the same victims signed
many forms, and many members of a household signed on behalf
Ramalingaswami, the spontaneous abortion figure among victims represents a 400%
increase over the normal rate. Diamond, supra note 4, at 18, col. 3.
36 The first American lawyer team arrived in Bhopal only four days after the
leak occurred. This team consisited of John Coale, Arthur Lowy, and Ted Dickinson.
Coale and Lowy represented 12 of the Americans held hostage in Iran in 1979.
Dickinson, an investigator, is part of Coale and Lowy's Washington team. A second
team, consisting of Jay Gould, Frederico Sayre, and Ralph Fertig, from a law firm
in California, arrived less than a week later. The firm employing Gould, Sayre, and
Fertig has been involved in a suit against A.H. Robins, maker of the Dalkon Shield.
Stevens, U.S. Lawyers are Arriving to Prepare Big Damage Suits, N.Y. Times, Dec.
12, 1984, at 10, col. 1.
11 John Coale claims to have enlisted 68,000 victims. He also claims to have
30,000 retainer forms in his Washington office. Houston's Benton Musslewhite is
claiming more than 2,000 clients. Mahandra Mehta, an attorney in Chicago, says
he has over 60,000 clients with more to follow, and Benjamin Harvard of Houston
claims he has collected at least 10,000 retainers. Many of the retainers were drafted
in English and signed by illiterate victims. Adler, Bhopal Journal: Only the Victims
Lack a Strategy, AM. LAW. 128, 134-35 (Apr. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Victims].
The retainer forms authorize an attorney to represent the signee in any legal action
taken on behalf of the signee.
38 At its midyear convention in January 1985, the governing board of the As-
sociation of Trial Lawyers of America rejected a resolution viewed as a condemnation
of lawyers who rushed to Bhopal shortly after the gas leak disaster. Commenting
on the proposed condemnation of those lawyers involved in the Bhopal uproar,
ATLA President Scott Baldwin said of the board of governors, "[wle don't have
the facts to do that, and we're not the body to do that." Galante, ATLA Board
Rejects Bhopal Censure, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 28, 1985, at 3, cols. 1-3. Of the 75 board
members present, only two voted for the condemnation resolution. Id. at 10, col.
3.
3 One writer in the New York Times stated that "Ithe rush of American lawyers
who descended on Bhopal last week was both insulting and inappropriate." Stein,
Paying Bhopal Victims, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1984, at A31, col. 3.
40 See Galanter, Legal Torpor: Why so Little has Happened in India After the
Bhopal Tragedy, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 273, 292 (1985). One Bombay and Delhi lawyer
stated that "[blut for the American lawyers, there wouldn't be any litigation against
Union Carbide. I say God bless them. They deserve to be thanked by the Indian
nation." Stewart, Why Suits for Damages Such as Bhopal Claims are Very Rare in
India, Wall St. J., Jan. 23, 1985, at 28, col. 2. Robert Sullivan, a plaintiff's lawyer
from the firm Lipsig, Sullivan & Liapakis P.C., in New York was quoted as saying
"without us . ..these victims wouldn't get squat." Riley, Suprise Move Cancels
First Bhopal Hearing, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 18, 1985, at 1, col. 3.
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of a single family member who had been injured or killed. 4' Another
problem concerns the actual validity of such retainer forms. Both
the American 2 and Indian legal systems prohibit solicitation of clients.43
Following the chemical leak in Bhopal," the Indian state govern-
ment established public legal offices throughout the city. These offices
provided free advice and assistance regarding filing claims against
Union Carbide. As a result, many claims were filed in Bhopal. 45 In
response to the filing of claims by Indian victims, 46 Union Carbide
assembled a team of Indian lawyers 47 to protest each claim 48 filed in
41 J.D. Simhal, the Bhopal bar association president, states that many victims
probably signed several retainer forms. Simhal stated, "Ithe people of the most
suffering area are poor and illiterate. Whoever goes to them, they think that only
that man can help him .... There was repetition of claims over and over." Victims,
supra note 37, at 134.
42 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (Proposed Final Draft
1984), which states that a lawyer is not to solicit employment from a prospective
client with whom he has no prior relationship when pecuniary gain is a strong motive
behind the solicitation; see also Figa, Lawyer Solicitation Today and Under the
Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 393 (1981).
41 See Galanter, supra note 40, at 278. For a general discussion of the legal
profession in India, see Galanter, The Study of the Indian Legal Profession, 3 LAW
& Soc'y REV. 201 (1968).
- Three days after the accident, Bhopal police seized the records from the Bhopal
plant, shut down and sealed off the factory, and detained five senior Indian plant
managers at the factory site for questioning. Hazarika, India Police Seize Factory
Records of Union Carbide, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1984, at Al, col. 3, A10, col. 2.
41 Galanter, supra note 40, at 290. Free legal aid is relatively new in India. Id.
at 288. The state of Madhya Pradesh, home of the Bhopal plant, has initiated a
state-wide legal aid program to aid the poor in obtaining access to courts of law.
This program was started soon after free legal aid became an Indian constitutional
right in 1976. Shrimal, Justice -to the Poor: The Relevance of Legal Activism, 8
AcAD. L. REV. 165, 167 (1984).
After the accident the Madhya Pradesh Government established "legal aid and
guidance camps" to assist victims in filing their complaints. The legal aid societies
have filed over 2,000 separate claims for damages. Galanter, supra note 40, at 283-
84. In addition, these state-funded societies have collected medical data on 36,000
other individuals whose claims have not yet been filed. Victims, supra note 37, at
130.
All claims filed against Union Carbide in India were assigned to the single
chief district judge, Virenda Singh Yadan. Judge Yadan handles each claim indi-
vidually, and he expects a total of 50,000 when all have been filed. Victims, supra
note 37, at 130.
11 Vijay Kumar Gupta, Union Carbide's chief outside counsel in Bhopal, is leading
a team of twelve lawyers to contest the complaints. Id. In all claims brought in
Bhopal, the Union Carbide parent company is denying it has any connection with
the Bhopal plant. Id.
48 All claims brought in India as a result of the Bhopal disaster have been stayed
as a result of the ordinance making India the sole representative of the victims.
Galanter, supra note 40, at 290. For an explanation of the ordinance and the Indian
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Bhopal's district court.49
As Indian lawyers were busy suing Union Carbide in India, Amer-
ican lawyers filed suits on behalf of victims in United States courts. 50
Lawyers in both India and the United States argued that courts in
their respective countries had jurisdiction over the cases.5 Indian
courts began to act on many of the claims filed, although the awards
were quite small compared to American damage awards. 52
In the midst of the rush to the courthouse in both countries, the
Indian Government passed an ordinance" providing that all claims
arising from the chemical would be combined, and that the Indian
Government would be the sole representative5 4 of the victims in a
Government's representation of the victims, see infra notes 53-56 and accompanying
text.
49 In Bhopal's district court, a single judge listens to many lawyers talking at
once; often the judge will hear three different cases at one time. The practice seems
to be common in India's district court system. Stewart, supra note 40, at 1, col. 1.
The backlog in the district courts and Indian high courts could run as high as one
million cases. Id. One reason for the backlog is the huge amount of matrimonial
litigation. Another reason is the over-used weapon of interlocutory relief. Dhavan,
For Whom? And For What? Reflections on the Legal Aftermath of Bhopal, 20
TEX. INT'L L.J. 295, 297 (1985).
30 Jay Gould and Frederico Sayre of Santa Monica, California filed a $20 billion
class-action suit in a federal court in New York on behalf of four Bhopal victims.
Melvin Belli also filed a $15 billion class-action suit on behalf of two victims in
Charleston, West Virginia. Stevens, supra note 36, at 10, col. 1.
1, Jurisdiction in India is based on the fact that the UCIL plant was the site of
the accident. Furthermore, all the prospective plaintiffs reside in India. Jurisdiction
in the United States is allegedly based on the idea that the parent company is
headquartered in the United States and is in control of its subsidiary in Bhopal.
See Westbrook, supra note 9, for insight on Union Carbide's relationship to the
UCIL plant and the disaster; see also infra notes 120-36 and accompanying text.
52 As of April 1, 1985, close to half of the 1,900 claims brought for death
payments had been awarded by the Bhopal court. The awards, however, were for
10,000 rupees each, only $794 in United States currency. Kramer, supra note 1, at
1, col. 1. By late November, 1,400 death payments had been granted. Weisman,
Bhopal is in Midst of Grim Recovery a Year After Leak, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1985,
at 18, col. 5. Although provided by relief payments from various public and private
donors, the awards are being distributed by the Indian Government. Adler, supra
note 29, at 57-58. In addition to the payments for death claims, the government
has made 24,000 payments of $125 to poor families in gas-affected neighborhoods.
Weisman, supra note 52, at 18, col. 5. There have been stories of fraud in the
distribution of the award money. In one instance a woman demanded payments for
each of three dead family members. A local news organization supporting the cause
of this claimant discovered that two of the family members were alive and the third
never existed. Id. at 18, col. 4.
,3 Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Ordinance, No. 1 of 1985, Feb. 20, 1985.
S4 The Indian Government is represented by Robins, Zelle, Larson & Kaplan, a
Minneapolis law firm specializing in products liability and mass disaster cases.
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single action against the American-based parent company." The pur-
pose behind the ordinance was for the Indian Government to win a
large award in a United States court, and then to disburse the com-
pensation to the victims.
5 6
The next step for the Indian Government was to find legal rep-
resentation in the United States. India sent its Attorney General to
the United States,5 7 who retained a Minneapolis firm specializing in
mass disaster cases.58 The Indian Government then filed suit against
Union Carbide in New York's Southern District Court on behalf of
the disaster victims.5 9 The suit sought both compensatory and punitive
damages in an unspecified amount, 60 and was filed only three days
after Prime Minister Gandhi rejected a Union Carbide settlement
offer of $200 million. 61
Barnett, Smith, Shapiro, Simon & Armstrong of New York acts as local counsel
for the Indian Government. Lewin, supra note 4, at D2, col. 4.
1 Riley, New Bhopal Law May Affect Future Role of U.S. Lawyers, Nat'l L.J.,
Mar. 11, 1985, at 4, col. I. The ordinance provides a plan for collecting and
dispersing compensation to victims, and allows any victim, at his or her own expense,
to hire a lawyer "of his choice to be associated in the conduct of any suit." Id.
at 4, col. 2.
6 Id. Although the ordinance was passed with the idea that litigation would arise,
it also authorizes the Indian Government to settle the suit before trial. Id.
11 According to a government announcement, the mission of Attorney General
K. Parasaran was to consult lawyers in the United States about the jurisdiction of
American courts to hear claims filed on behalf of the gas tragedy victims. The true
purpose of the trip was. to come to a decision about retaining an American law
firm. Galanter, supra note 40, at 284.
58 Robins, Zelle, Larson & Kaplan has represented plaintiffs in some of the worst
tragedies of the last decade: the MGM Grand Hotel fire in Las Vegas, the collapsed
skywalks at the Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel, and the collapse of Idaho's Teton
Dam in 1976. Kings of Catastrophe, TIME, Apr. 22, 1985, at 80.
11 The April 8, 1985 lawsuit against Union Carbide outlined six separate theories
of liability: absolute liability, strict liability, negligence, breach of warranty, mis-
representation, and the multinational enterprise liability theory. Riley, Bhopal" The
Legal Escalation Begins in Earnest, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 22, 1985, at 8, col. 1.
o Galanter, supra note 40, at 286. The complaint stated that the punitive damage
award should be "in an amount sufficient to deter Union Carbide and any other
multinational corporation from the willful, malicious and wanton disregard of the
rights and safety of the citizens of those countries in which they do business."
Lewin, supra note 4, at 1, col. 5.
61 Galanter, supra note 40, at 285. This figure of $200 million matches the amount
of insurance coverage carried by Union Carbide. Id. Other reports state that the
Indian Government declined to accept an offer of $840,000 from Carbide India,
but accepted an offer of $1 million from the American parent company for general
relief. The $1 million in relief equals about $5 for each of the 200,000 victims
injured. Victims, supra note 37, at 131. Under this type of relief arrangement, no
money would be provided for those claiming compensation for deceased relatives.
At least 1,700 victims were killed in the accident. See Lewin, supra note 4, at D2,
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The Indian Government suit, however, was not the last to be filed
in the line of litigation arising from the disaster. The Indian Gov-
ernment's action in the case was not favored by many American
lawyers representing Bhopal victims. 62 Two leading American lawyers
in the Bhopal litigation filed suit in India63 to block the Government's
consolidated representation effort. They argued that the sole repre-
sentation ordinance passed by the Indian Government violated the
right of citizens under the Indian Constitution to choose their own
counsel.6 The suit also maintained that the Indian Government could
not represent the Bhopal victims because the government may itself
have shared in the responsibility for the accident. 65
All the suits brought in the United States as a result of the disaster6
have been consolidated before federal court Judge John F. Keenan
in New York's Southern District. 67 These cases remain consolidated
col. 1. Another government source said that Union Carbide offered to settle for
$500 million over 30 years, but this offer was also rejected. Kings of Catastrophe,
supra note 58, at 80.
62 Riley, supra note 59, at 8, cols. 2-4.
61 The two lawyers are Jerry S. Cohen of the Washington, D.C. firm Kohn,
Milstein, Cohen, & Hausfeld, and Stanley M. Chesley of the Cincinnati firm Waite,
Schneider, Bayless & Chesley Co. L.P.A. These two men represent a 29-member
group of lawyers filing claims in the United States, and they currently seek to manage
the Bhopal litigation now pending before Judge Keenan. Id. at 8, col. 3.
Article 14 of India's Constitution reads as follows: "The State shall not deny
to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within
the territory of India." INDIA CONST. art. XIV. The rule applies to equality of
substantive rights as well as equality of procedural rights. This broad scope of
protection grants to all litigants the same procedural rights for relief and defense
without discrimination. Under these procedural rights falls the right to choose one's
own counsel. See D. SEN, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 200-
10 (1966).
615 According to the American lawyers' complaint, the Indian Government may
have been at fault by failing to enforce safety regulations at the Bhopal plant. The
lawyers maintain that if the Indian Government did share in the responsibility for
the accident, taking over the victims' claims would present a conflict of interest.
Lewin, supra note 4, at D2, col. 4.
- More than $100 billion in claims have been filed against Union Carbide in the
United States. Diamond, India Wants U.S. Courts to Handle Bhopal Cases, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 7, 1985, at 43, col. 5.
67 In re Union Carbide Corporation, MDL 626 (S.D.N.Y.). The Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation has consolidated all 64 competing lawsuits in the Southern
District of New York and assigned the case to Judge John F. Keenan. Cates, 100
Lawyers Start the Legal Cleanup, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 29, 1985, at 13, col. 1. Congress
established the Judicial Panel in 1968 to deal with related cases that were filed in
different federal district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982). The Panel consists of
seven federal circuit and district court judges chosen by the Supreme Court. 28
U.S.C. § 1407(d). The Panel is to transfer the cases for pre-trial proceedings when
these proceedings "will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will
promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions." 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
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for discovery purposes only. 68 Judge Keenan laid down early guidelines
for the case, 69 the most notable of which was the establishment of
a three-member committee to lead the litigation.
7 0
On July 31, 1985, Bud G. Holman of the New York law firm
Kelley, Drye & Warren, filed Union Carbide's motion for forum non
conveniens 7' in the New York District Court. The plaintiffs filed two
61 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1982). At the conclusion of discovery proceedings,
all the actions transferred will be remanded by the Panel to the district from which
they came. Id.
Carbide has tried to limit discovery on the forum non conveniens question to the
pleadings, brief, and affidavits of the parties. On August 14, 1985, however, Judge
Keenan ordered that discovery be permitted on the issue of forum non conveniens,
and the door soon opened for broader discovery than Carbide had wanted. Michael
Dolinger, Magistrate in charge of discovery, ruled on September 19, 1985, that
Carbide must answer questions revealing its evidence on possible sabotage of the
plant. Carbide had previously refused to answer such questions. In addition, Carbide
must answer questions on how much control it exerted over operation of the Bhopal
plant; further, plaintiffs were permitted to depose three Carbide officials. Adler,
supra note 29, at 60-61.
69 The hearings on the Bhopal litigation were scheduled to begin on March 12,
1985, just 99 days after the accident. Less than a week before the first hearing,
however, Judge Keenan notified the scores of lawyers involved that the case was
being adjourned until April 16, 1985. Riley, supra note 40, at 24, col. 1. Before
the first hearing, the plaintiffs' lawyers were primarily led by a 29-member steering
committee with two co-chairmen, Stanley Chesley of Cincinnati's Waite, Schneider,
Bayless, & Chesley Co. L.P.A., and Jerry Cohen of Washington, D.C.'s Kohn,
Milstein, Cohen & Hausfeld. Id. at 24-25. At the April 16 hearing, Judge Keenan
urged Union Carbide to provide $5-10 million in immediate aid to be credited against
any future settlement or judgment. Judge Keenan also urged that an interim relief
plan be developed fbr the Bhopal victims. Cates, supra note 67, at 13, col. 2.
70 Judge Keenan told the large group of plaintiffs' lawyers in the first pre-trial
hearing that "[they had one week to choose two from their number to serve on
an executive committee with a representative of the Indian Government." Cates,
supra note 67, at 13, col. 1. The purpose of the committee was to establish leadership
in the pre-trial proceedings of the litigation. The many lawyers are divided over
three problems in the case: (a) whether the suit should be pursued as a class action;
(b) whether attorneys should push for litigation or settlement; and (c) how much
cooperation there should be with the Indian Government. Id. at 13, cols. 1-2.
The plaintiffs' committee, led by Stanley Chesley and F. Lee Bailey, has opened
a Bhopal litigation office in New York. The committee assessed a tax of $3,000 on
each of the more than 100 firms that have collected Bhopal clients and wish to
remain involved with these clients. Adler, supra note 29, at 28. According to Bud
Holman, attorney for Union Carbide, a number of lawyers who are not part of the
plaintiffs' executive committee have approached him in recent months in an effort
to negotiate separate deals to settle their own cases. Id. at 62.
7, Id. at 27, 58. The strongest argument in the 65-page memorandum is that
virtually all of the plaintiffs, relevant witnesses, and key documents are in India,
and the cost of transporting everyone involved to the United States for trial would
be prohibitive. The memorandum also states that Indian law will probably be applied
in the case, and that Indian courts are far more competent to apply Indian law
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briefs in opposition to the motion on December 6, 1985,72 asserting
that India does not provide an adequate alternative forum, 7 and that
Union Carbide's control over the Bhopal plant was so significant 74
that a United States court is justified in accepting jurisdiction over
the case. 75 Lawyers on both sides argued the forum non conveniens
than are American courts. In addition, other potential defendants such as subcon-
tractors, suppliers, and UCIL itself are in India and are not subject to jurisdiction
in the United States. Holman is so firmly committed to the forum non conveniens
argument that when answering questions on other areas involved in the suit, he
invariably refers back to the doctrine. His references to the doctrine became so
numerous that at one pre-trial hearing Judge Keenan called him "Johnny one-note."
Id. at 58, cols. 1-3.
If the forum non conveniens motion is granted, Union Carbide will argue in India
that the UCIL plant is an independent company over which the parent has no
control. If this argument is successful, damage awards will be limited to $70 million,
the total assets of UCIL. Id. at 62, col. 1.
72 Riley, Will Bhopal Plaintiffs Beat Some Big Odds?, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 23, 1985,
at 3, col. 1. Lawyers for the Indian Government joined in drafting the Bhopal
Plaintiffs' Executive Committee brief and guided United States lawyers in forming
the argument that the Indian judicial system is wholly unable to handle the number
of claims arising out of the accident. Id. at 11, col. 1.
1 The briefs set forth a very unusual contention. The Indian Government stated
that victims seeking compensation could not get a fair trial in India's own courts.
Diamond, supra note 66, at 33, col. 1. Commenting on this argument, Seymour J.
Rubin, former executive director of the American Society of International Law,
stated, "I have never heard of a country saying that its own courts could not afford
its citizens an adequate remedy. Inevitably, if India prevails, a lot more cases will
be filed by other poor countries against the head officers of transnational companies,
whether it is the United States, Canada, France or Germany." Id. at 43, col. 5.
14 Plaintiffs argue that a United States court has an interest in hearing the case
based on the idea that Carbide exercised active control over the UCIL plant. Adler,
supra note 29, at 58. To support this argument, the plaintiffs introduced several
documents demonstrating a connection between Union Carbide India and its Amer-
ican-based parent. Id. at 61. The documents included statements from Carbide
officials that "it is the general policy of the corporation to secure and maintain
effective management control of an affiliate" to "assure that corporate policies and
procedures on safety are observed." Diamond, supra note 66, at 43, col. 6. Carbide
also provided designs for the plant, trained several of its workers, and helped initiate
the operation. Id.
In addition to these controls, the documents revealed that in May 1984, Union
Carbide officials discussed a sale or lease of part of the plant because of unprof-
itability. Officials also discussed the possibility of dismantling the Bhopal plant and
shipping parts of it to Brazil or Indonesia. Riley, supra note 72, at 11, col. 2. Union
Carbide received a report on the costs of dismantling the plant just five days before
the accident. Meier, Carbide Review on Closing Bhopal Plant was Under Way
Shortly Before Disaster, Wall St. J., Sept. 27, 1985, at 6, cols. 5-6.
1, In addition to arguing control by the parent company and inadequacy of an
Indian forum, plaintiffs argued that the Bhopal litigation could be handled through
a single trial on liability and punitive damages issues, followed by representative
damage trials which could provide guidance on the settlement value of the cases.
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motion orally before Judge Keenan on January 3, 1986.76 As of this
writing, no decision has been handed down on the forum non con-
veniens issue.
III. INDIAN AND AMERICAN FORUMS COMPARED
The importance of the forum non conveniens issue in the Bhopal
litigation is based on the fact that the outcome of the case would
be vastly different if the case were tried in India rather than in the
United States. Legal scholars and others maintain that the United
States is the better forum for at least two reasons: 77 better admin-
istration of the cases, and higher damage awards for victims. 78 This
section briefly compares and contrasts the differences between the
Indian and American forums in three important areas: (a) theories
of liability; (b) compensation awards; and (c) procedural differences
between the two jurisdictions.
A. Three Theories of Liability
Regardless of which forum ultimately tries the Bhopal litigation,
the plaintiffs will probably assert at least three theories of liability:
Riley, supra note 72, at 11, col. 2. Counsel for Union Carbide, however, has stated
that Carbide may not agree to representative damage trials and has further suggested
that every claimant seeking relief may have to appear in court. This "litigate to the
bitter end approach" could mean as many as 200,000 separate damage trials. Adler,
supra note 29, at 62.
76 Judge Keenan listened to hours of arguments by attorneys on the quality of
the American and Indian systems of justice, and on whether the parent company
controlled operation of the Indian subsidiary plant. Diamond, supra note 22, at 41,
col. 4. Keenan's decision, which is expected in early 1986, will likely have a profound
effect on future settlement talks. Bhopal Venue Arguments Set Today, Atlanta
Const., Jan. 3, 1986, at D8, col. I. For a thorough bibliography focusing on the
background of the Bhopal disaster, and the problems, regulations and litigation
involving transnational corporations engaged in the production of hazardous tech-
nologies, see McFadden, A Selected Bibliography on Hazardous Activities, Tech-
nology and the Law: Bhopal and Beyond, 19 INT'L LAW. 1459 (1985).
1 Legal scholars who have written on this subject agree with many Indian officials
that the Indian legal system is incapable of handling the Bhopal litigation and
properly compensating the victims. See Galanter, supra note 40; Weinberg, Insights
and Ironies: The American Bhopal Cases, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 307 (1985); McGarity,
Bhopal and the Expert of Hazardous Technologies, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 333 (1985).
The chief justice of the Indian Supreme Court firmly believes that the only hope
of compensation for the victims can be found in an American court. Stewart, supra
note 40, at 1, col. 1. One prominent lawyer in Bhopal has stated that "[tlhere are
numerous cases in Bhopal, but we think we will get nothing because there's no
remedy." Victims, supra note 37, at 132.
11 For a discussion of the differences in the compensation of tort victims in
Indian and American forums, see infra notes 137-57 and accompanying text.
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absolute or strict liability, negligence, and multinational enterprise
liability. 79 Strict and absolute liability are well-established theories of
liability in the United States which have not yet been applied in
India. 0 Even though Indian courts have yet to adopt the theories of
11 Two additional theories, breach of warranty and misrepresentation, could be
raised under United States tort law; however, breach of warranty and misrepresen-
tation are not found in Indian tort law. Instead, these doctrines are used defensively
in Indian contract law to justify the nonpayment of insurance benefits to a claimant.
See, e.g., Kamla Wanti v. L.I.C. of India, 1981 A.I.R. 366 (All.) (life insurance
company did not succeed on a theory of misrepresentation alleging the deceased
had concealed his diabetes and carbuncle); V. Srinivasa Pillai v. L.I.C. of India,
1977 A.I.R. 381 (Mad.) (the same life insurance company was successful on a theory
of misrepresentation proving a pregnant woman had concealed this fact on her
policy).
If the claims are tried in India, the court probably will not apply the breach of
warranty or misrepresentation theories because there was no contract between Union
Carbide and the citizens of Bhopal. One possible way in which the Indian court
could apply these theories would be through a breach of contract claim concerning
the technology-transfer agreement which existed between Union Carbide and the
UCIL plant. Westbrook, supra note 9, at 328. The agreement specified that Union
Carbide would gradually transfer to the UCIL plant the ability to produce pesticides.
Pesticide Plant, supra note 2, at 8, col, 1. See also Relationship of the Companies,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1985, at Al, col. 1. The technology-transfer agreement, however,
will be important only if an Indian court finds UCIL solely responsible for the
accident, and UCIL later attempts to sue the parent company for contribution and
indemnity. UCIL could then claim that the parent company breached an implied
warranty in the agreement to keep technology updated and to provide proper training.
See Westbrook, supra note 9, at 328. For a discussion of technology transfer to
developing countries, see generally Bryne, Transfer of Technology to Developing
Nations, 129 NEW L.J. 309 (1979); Goldscheider, The Technology Transfer Process:
A Vehicle for Continuity and Change, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 255 (1981).
Misrepresentation and breach of warranty in United States tort law occur as
separate grounds for liability in product liability cases, as well as other tort actions.
In a broad sense, misrepresentation occurs when a defendant misleads the plaintiff,
whether intentionally or unintentionally, and the plaintiff is injured as a result of
the defendant's deceptive statements or conduct. See generally W. KEETON, D. DOBBS,
R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, § 105, at 726 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. Breach of warranty occurs when a defendant sells a
product to the plaintiff and the product fails to perform the way in which the
defendant either expressed or implied that it would. UNEORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
2-318 (1978). In breach of warranty cases, the defendant can be held strictly liable
for injuries caused by the product on the basis of an express or implied warranty
of safety that passes with the product upon sale. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). Alternatives A, B, and C in § 2-
318 of the Uniform Commercial Code define the potential scope of liability in breach
of warranty cases. U.C.C. § 2-318 (Alternatives A, B, C). The problem with the
breach of warranty and misrepresentation theories in the Bhopal case is that there
was never a sale on which to base a breach of warranty, and there was no repre-
sentation to the citizens of Bhopal as to the design or safety of the plant upon
which they could bring a claim for misrepresentation.
s0 For a discussion of strict and absolute liability in United States tort law, see
infra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
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strict and absolute liability, sufficient precedent exists for an Indian
court to apply these theories in the Bhopal litigation.81 The theory
of negligence is firmly recognized in both Indian and United States
tort law, 82 while the multinational enterprise liability theory is a novel
theory which has neither been accepted nor rejected in India or the
United States.83
Tort law is the one major area of law which remains largely
uncodified in India. 84 This result is partially due to the fact that in
India a wrong committed against another is often dealt with through
criminal charges rather than through civil suits;85 therefore, few tort
cases are filed in India.86 When a tort suit does arise, Indian courts
often rely on English common law to resolve the dispute.8 7 Although
Indian courts are not forced to rely on English common law, they
are required to act in "equity and good conscience" in the absence
of specified statutory law;88 however, an Indian court acting in equity
and good conscience may only apply a principle of English common
law if the "principle does not depend upon any technicality of English
law," and the principle is applicable to the case before the court. 89
1. Absolute or Strict Liability
Both absolute liability and strict liability denote a type of liability
, See infra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
S2 For a discussion of the doctrine of negligence as applied in the Indian and
American forums, see infra notes 110-19 and accompanying text.
11 The multinational enterprise liability theory is discussed infra notes 120-36 and
accompanying text.
14 Galanter, supra note 40, at 275. When the British systemized the Indian legal
system in the 19th century, complete codes of all fields of criminal, commercial,
and procedural law were adopted. Id. One significant reason that tort law was never
codified in India is that the legislative branch, responsible for codification of such
law, felt that a large part of tort law was better handled by the criminal justice
system which had been codified. Id. at 276 n. 13. For a discussion of the development
of the modern Indian legal system, see Galanter, The Displacement of Traditional
Law in Modern India, 24 J. Soc. IssuEs 65 (1968).
95 Criminal complaints are preferred over civil suits because a large payment must
be made in advance before one may file a civil complaint. Galanter, supra note 40,
at 275 n.10. Compensation for the victim often comes in the form of specific relief.
Id. at 275. For an explanation of the large filing fees in India for civil suits, see
infra notes 195-205 and accompanying text.
86 Id. at 275-76.
11 Id. at 276. See also D. TIAKoRE & M. VAKu., THE ENGLISH AND INDIAN LAW
OF TORTS 1 (19th ed. 1965). However, as more tort suits are heard, precedent in
Indian case law grows.
88 Id. at 1. See also Baboo Thakur Dhobi v. Mst. Subanshi, (1942) 25 Nag. L.J.
199.
19 Eastern M.C. Ltd. v. Premier Auto Ltd., (1962) 65 Bom. L.R. 183.
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without fault and are therefore considered together in this section.§A
The early English case, Fletcher v. Rylands,9' first enunciated the
rule of strict liability. The basic concept behind strict liability is that
in certain cases a person may be held liable for any injury which he
has caused, even though he has committed no moral wrongdoing nor
departed in any way from a reasonable standard of care.92 Under
this theory, liability is often found for an injury caused by the
defendant's unusual and abnormal activities in the community. 93
Moreover, strict liability could be applied in an Indian as well as in
a United States court.
a. Indian Courts
No Indian court has had occasion to apply strict liability in a mass
tort suit such as the Bhopal case; however, the Indian Supreme Court
did briefly consider the doctrine in Manjushri v. B. L. Gupta.94 The
Manjushri case involved an automobile accident under the Motor
Vehicles Act (1939). Although it held that strict liability could not
be applied under the Act, the Court emphasized the need to establish
a theory of no-fault liability in Indian tort law. 95
10 A technical distinction would be to apply strict liability in cases where injuries
were caused by defective products and absolute liability in cases where injuries were
caused by a substance escaping its usual bounds. See Lewin, The Big Lawsuits: Will
They be Tried in U.S., N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1984, at 10, col. 5. Today in United
States tort literature, however, the general term used is "strict liability," and the
doctrine of strict products liability is applied in defective product cases. There is no
difference, however, in the scope of liability for strict and absolute liability. Both
allow for liability without fault. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAims, THE LAW OF TORTS,
§ 14.1, at 787 (1956).
11 1 L.R.-Ex. 265 (1866). The rule of absolute liability, as laid down by Judge
Blackburn in the Exchequer Chamber and later approved by the House of Lords,
is as follows:
We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own
purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely
to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does
not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural
consequence of its escape.
Id. at 279.
92 PROSSER, supra note 79, § 75, at 536.
91 Id. § 75, at 537.
1977 A.I.R. 1158 (S.C.).
91 The court stated in Manjushri:
The time is ripe for serious consideration of creating no-fault liability.
Having regard to the directive principles of State policy, . . . the nation-
alisation of general insurance companies and the expanding trend towards
nationalisation of bus transport, the law of torts based on no-fault needs
reform.
Id. at 1159. The willingness of the Supreme Court of India to consider the doctrine
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The Indian Supreme Court is not the only court in India which
has considered strict liability. At least one state supreme court in
India has applied the principle of no-fault liability under the Motor
Vehicles Act. 96 The Indian Supreme Court, however, overruled the
decision of the state supreme court, holding that the Motor Vehicles
Act provided for liability only upon a showing of fault 9 7 Although
the Indian Supreme Court has refused to apply strict liability in
automobile accident cases, sufficient precedent exists to allow the
Indian judicial system to recognize the doctrine in mass tort suits
and thus to apply strict liability in the Bhopal litigation.
Although a dearth of Indian cases apply strict liability, an Indian
court could adopt the principles of this doctrine directly from English
common law. 9 English courts have applied the theory of strict liability
to what may be described as "dangerous things." 99 Persons who deal
with electricity in bulk,1°° herbicides in crop-dusting, 101 and those
who collect large quantities of noxious and inherently dangerous
sewage10 2 have all been held to the strict liability standard of Rylands.
Arguably, persons who use dangerous chemicals in the manufacture
of pesticides could also be placed in the class of those involved in
dangerous operations. As a result, an Indian court could, through
analogy, find that the UCIL plant was involved in an activity in-
of strict liability indicates that the doctrine could be applied successfully in the
Bhopal case.
*' In the case of Marine and General Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Balkrishna, 1977 A.I.R.
53 (Bom.), the High Court of Bombay applied the doctrine of. absolute liability for
injuries caused in an automobile accident. The High Court stated:
The Tribunal has power to determine what is "just" compensation irre-
spective of whether the defendant was at fault or was negligent or careless
or not. When a person is injured by use of a vehicle, that itself is an
infringement of a right. That person must, therefore, have a remedy of
recovering compensation from the person whose vehicles has caused injury.
Id. at 65.
"' The view of the Bombay High Court was rejected by the Supreme Court of
India in Minu B. Mehta v. Balkrishna, 1977 A.I.R. 1248 (S.C.). The Supreme Court
stated in Minu B. Mehta that the principles of no-fault liability could not be found
in the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, upon which the Bombay court had
based its decision. Id. at 1259.
11 See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text. If no Indian case precedent
exists, the Indian court acting in equity and good conscience is free to look to the
case precedent of English common law.
" R. HEUSTON, SALMOND ON THE LAW OF TORTS 323 (17th ed. 1977). Strict
liability is also imposed when injury results from the defendant's non-natural use
of the land. Id. at 312.
"" See, e.g., N.W. Utilities v. London Guarantee Co., 1936 A.C. 108.
o, See, e.g., Michalchuk v. Ratke (1966) 57 D.L.R.(2d) 269.
See, e.g., Smeaton v. Ilford Corp. [1954] 1 Ch. 450, 472.
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herently dangerous to citizens of Bhopal, and that strict liability
should necessarily apply to such operations. Adoption of this analysis
would render the Union Carbide Corporation strictly responsible for
the Bhopal disaster without any showing of negligence.
b. United States Courts
The doctrine of strict liability could also be used as a basis for
recovery in a United States court. 103 A majority of United States
jurisdictions apply the rule of Rylands. 104 By imposing strict liability,
several courts have emphasized that a hazardous activity causes great
likelihood of risk to others because of the locality in which it was
performed.105 Some United States courts, however, have applied strict
liability even when an activity is performed in its natural sur-
roundings. 106
Under a theory of strict liability, the defendant can be held liable
even though not negligent in proximately causing the harm.10 7 The
103 The most recent rule of strict liability in United States tort law, according to
at least one legal scholar, is as follows:
If an enterpriser deliberately and consciously engages in an activity that is
highly dangerous even when reasonable care is exercised and if the activity
is one that is not the kind commonly engaged in such as automobile driving,
then such intentional exposure of another to great danger, however socially
desirable the activity, can generally be regarded as a sound basis on which
to allocate the risk of loss to the person or entity engaging in that ultra-
hazardous and abnormally dangerous activity.
PROSSER, supra note 79, § 78, at 556. See generally Sachs, Negligence or Strict
Product Liability: Is There Really a Difference in Law or Economics?, 8 GA. J.
INT'L & CoMP. L. 259 (1978) (concluding that accident and safety levels have not
been significantly improved because of the adoption of strict liability).
'04 PROSSER, supra note 79, § 78, at 549. The principle found in Rylands is rejected
by name in only seven United States jurisdictions: Maine, New Hampshire, New
York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas, and Wyoming. Id. But even in these juris-
dictions, the principle of Rylands has been applied under various other theories. Id.
§ 78, at 552.
10I Id. § 78, at 551; see also Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., 54 F.2d 510
(2d Cir. 1931) (dynamite stored in a hut which was located close to a thickly settled
town); Yommer v. McKenzie, 255 Md. 220, 257 A.2d 138 (1969) (storage of large
quantities of gasoline immediately adjacent to a private residence); Luthringer v.
Moore, 31 Cal.2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948) (using hydrocyanic acid for the purposes
of fumigating a commercial building in which there was a great many tenants
considered to be an "ultra-hazardous activity").
1o See, e.g., Siegler v. Kuhlman, 81 Wash.2d 448, 502 P.2d 1181 (1973) (truck
driver held strictly liable when the decedent drove into and ignited a pool of gasoline
which had spilled onto the highway after defendant's trailer, fully loaded with
gasoline, broke loose from the cab and overturned).
,07 PROSSER, supra note 79, § 78, at 559. To apply strict liability, the defendant
must be aware of the abnormally dangerous activity. Once it has been established
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doctrine is usually applied when the defendant injures another by
participating in an unduly dangerous activity which is inappropriate
to the place where it is being performed. 08 If the Bhopal case were
decided in the United States, the court would almost certainly apply
the doctrine of strict liability and find the defendant strictly liable
for participating in an activity unduly dangerous in its surroundings.'°9
2. Negligence
In addition to the doctrine of strict liability, an Indian court may
hold Union Carbide responsible for the disaster under the theory of
negligence. The classic definition of negligence was laid down in the
early English case of Blythe v. Birmingham Water Works. 0 In Blythe
the court defined negligence as "the omission to do something which
a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something
which a prudent or reasonable man would not do.""' Both Indian
courts and United States courts have used the rule of Blythe as a
foundation for the theory of negligence; therefore, the principles for
applying negligence are similar in both forums.
Negligence is proved in both Indian and United States courts by
the defendant was aware of the activity and nevertheless permitted it to occur, the
defendant is said to be acting "at his peril." Id.
Id- i. § 78, at 547-48. The Second Restatement of Torts, however, applies a
balancing test. If the court finds an activity to be "abnormally dangerous" after
weighing certain factors, § 519 requires the court to apply strict liability. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §. 519 (1976). Section 520 sets forth six criteria that act as the
balancing test when a court is determining whether an activity is abnormally dan-
gerous. These criteria include: (1) the existence of a high degree of risk of some
harm to the person, land, or chattels of others; (2) a likelihood that the harm that
results from the activity will be great; (3) an inability to eliminate the risk by the
exercise of reasonable care; (4) the extent to which the activity is not a matter of
common usage; (5) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried
on; and (6) the extent to which the activity's value to the community is outweighed
by its dangerous attributes. Id. § 520. All six factors are weighed to determine
whether a danger is abnormal, but "[a]ny one of them is not necessarily sufficient
of itself in a particular case, and ordinarily several of them will be required for
strict liability." Id. § 520 comment f (1976). On the other hand, it is not necessary
that each factor be present if others will weigh heavily in the factual context of the
case. Id.
- One slum area with a population of approximately 3,000 people was spread
out directly in front of the main gate of the factory. Reinhold, supra note 5, at
A8, col. 2. Under a proposed law in India, a factory producing dangerous chemicals
must be situated at least 15 miles from populated areas. Hazarika, supra note 44,
at AI0, col. 4.
Il L.R.-Ex. 781 (1886).
Id. at 784.
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showing that the defendant breached a legal duty of reasonable care 12
owed to the plaintiff., 3 The theory is based on an objective standard
of conduct to which all members of society are expected to conform.1 4
In addition, the burden of proof in both jurisdictions rests with the
plaintiff. The plaintiff must prove the existence of a duty, the defend-
ant's breach of this duty, and the harm resulting from this breach." 5'
112 See R. ANAND & L. SASTRI, THE LAW OF TORTS 645 (3rd ed. 1967) for a
discussion of the duty of care in Indian law. See PROSSER, supra note 79, § 53, at
356-59 for a discussion on the duty of care in United States tort law.
-, See R. ANAND & L. SASTRI, supra note 112, at 644. In United States tort law,
both actual and proximate cause must be shown in a negligence action. Actual cause
refers to "cause in fact" which includes everything which contributed to the result,
and without which the result would not have occurred. PROSSER, supra note 79, §
41, at 265. The familiar "but for" test is often applied to prove cause in fact. Id.
§ 41, at 265-68.
Proximate cause, which also must be proved, can be used to limit liability where
cause in fact has already been established. Although several tests have been proposed
to apply proximate cause, the basic premise underlying all these tests is "whether
the policy of the law will extend the responsibility for the conduct to the consequences
which have in fact occurred." Id. § 42, at 273, 276. Thus, in a certain case, a court
could find that although an injury would not have occurred "but for" the defendant's
actions, his actions were not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. In this
case, the defendant would not be liable. Id. § 42, at 273; see, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) (employees of defendant dislodged
a package of explosives from a passenger's arms causing an explosion which over-
turned some scales several feet away and subsequently caused injury to the plaintiff.
The New York Court of Appeals concluded that but for the explosion the plaintiff
would not have been injured; however, the court refused to hold the defendants
negligent because they could not have foreseen the possibility of harm to the plaintiff);
cf. Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v. Proximate Cause and the Rational Allocations
of Functions Between Judge and Jury, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 1 (Professor Thode
argues that a duty-risk analysis should replace the proximate cause analysis in
negligence cases. Thode states that the duty-risk analysis is exclusively devoted to
the issue of whether there was a factual connection between the defendant's conduct
and the plaintiff's injury and cites the decision in Palsgraf as a form of the duty-
risk analysis).
1" For a discussion of the standard of conduct under Indian law, see R. ANAND
& L. SASTRI, supra note 112, at 648. Under United States tort law, a failure to
conform to the objective standard of conduct results in liability even though the
injury was caused solely by stupidity, forgetfulness, or sheer ignorance. PROSSER,
supra note 79, § 31, at 169.
The "reasonable man" standard was established in Blythe, but at least one author
believes "the man of ordinary prudence" standard was first established in the English
case, Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1837). PROSSER, supra note 79, §
82, at 592. In Vaughan the defendant owned a hayrick which was set near other
buildings on his land. When the hayrick spontaneously ignited, the fire spread to
the defendant's buildings as well as to cottages owned by the plaintiff. The court
found the defendant negligent because he failed to meet the standard of ordinary
prudence of a reasonable man under the same circumstances. Vaughan, 132 Eng.
Rep. at 492.
"I For an explanation of the burden of proof in Indian negligence actions, see
R. ANAND & L. SASTRI, supra note 112, at 651-52. In United States negligence
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One difference between the two forums is that if the case is heard
in India, Union Carbide may not be the only defendant in the case.
An Indian court may find the state and central governments in India
also liable" 6 for failure to exercise reasonable care in monitoring the
plant, and for failure to enforce worker safety and environmental
regulations at the plant."' 7 In a United States forum, however, these
actions, the jury must only be persuaded that the preponderance of the evidence
supports the party carrying the burden of proof. PROSSER, supra note 79, § 38, at
239.
116 See generally Bakshi, Law of Torts, 16 A.S.I.L. 339, 344 (1980) (in deciding
whether a government entity is liable for an act, an Indian court must distinguish
"sovereign" and "non-sovereign" activities. If the activity falls within the sphere
of "sovereign functions," the court will not hold the entity liable for the act). For
a general discussion of Indian Government liability, see Jacob, Vicarious Liability
of Government in Torts, 7 J. INDIAN L. INST. 247 (1965). The ruling authority in
India on sovereign immunity is the Indian Supreme Court case, Shyam Sunder v.
State of Rajasthan, 1974 A.I.R. 890 (S.C.).
,,7 Cf. Kasturi Lal v. State of U.P., 1965 A.I.R. 1039 (S.C.) (the Indian Supreme
Court stated that a government entity can be held liable for the tortious act of a
public servant unless that act is committed in the exercise of a delegated sovereign
function). Government liability is also recognized in the United States. United States
courts traditionally accepted the doctrine of governmental immunity, the law being
that unless the government consents to suit, it enjoys complete immunity. PROSSER,
supra note 79, § 131, at 1033. However, the doctrine of sovereign immunity has
steadily declined in the 20th century as evidenced by a Florida Supreme Court
decision, Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957), in which
the court held that a municipal corporation was not immune from liability for the
torts of its police officers. Id. at 133; see also Olson, Governmental Immunity from
Tort Liability Two Decades of Decline: 1959-79, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 485, 489 (1979).
At least 30 states have abrogated state sovereign immunity in a substantial or general
way. PROSSER, supra note 79, § 131, at 1045.
The immunity of the United States Federal Government was restricted by enactment
of the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946. 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1982). Theoretically,
the Act provides a prospective plaintiff with an appropriate legal basis for seeking
redress from the Federal Government for injuries caused by a negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the Federal Government acting within the scope
of his employment. Id. § 1346(b). The Indian Government, however; would not be
subject to the Federal Tort Claims Act in a United States court because the Act is
restricted to those actions brought against the United States. For a further discussion
of United States Government liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act for failure
to inspect, see Basanta, Federal Tort Liability for Negligent Mine Safety Inspections,
85 W. VA. L. REV. 519 (1983); Note, The Federal Seal of Approval: Government
Liability for Negligent Inspection, 62 GEO. L.J. 937 (1974).
The Federal Tort Claims Act imposes certain substantive and procedural limits
for any claim brought against the United States Government: (1) jurisdiction is vested
exclusively in federal district courts; (2) all suits against the United States, except
those involving tax claims, are tried without a jury; (3) a two-year statute of limitations
is in force on all damage claims, which must also be in writing and directed to the
responsible administrative agency; if the agency denies the claim, the action must
be filed within six months; and (4) strict liability cannot be applied under the statute.
PROSSER, supra note 79, § 131, at 1035-36. In addition, the Federal Government
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governments would be immune from suit."'
Nevertheless, the circumstances of the Bhopal disaster indicate that
a strong case for negligence could be brought against the Union
Carbide Corporation in either an Indian or a United States court.
First, Union Carbide owed a duty to the citizens of Bhopal to act
reasonably in maintaining the plant. Second, a court could find Union
Carbide breached this duty by failing to maintain properly machinery
and safety devices at the plant. Specifically, many of the gauges were
unreliable, the plant was not equipped with a computer system used
in other Carbide plants designed to alert the staff to leaks quickly,
and the plant had no effective public warning system."19 Third, the
retains immunity for all government conduct that involves discretionary functions
or duties. Id. at 1039. Following the Supreme Court case Dalehite v. United States,
346 U.S. 15 (1953), many courts have interpreted this discretionary function to allow
the immunity if the government's action occurred at the planning level of a decision
or activity. PROSSER, supra note 79, § 131, at 1040. Once the activity reaches the
operational level, however, the immunity disappears and the activity must be carried
out with reasonable care. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61
(1955) (the Court held that the United States could be held liable under the Federal
Tort Claims Act if the Coast Guard's failure to operate and maintain a lighthouse
with due care caused harm to the petitioners). Furthermore, a court may refuse to
apply the discretionary test where the government's activity is affirmative, specific,
and in violation of a statute, regulation, or constitutional provision which imposes a
duty upon the government. Within the area of statutory duty, liability often arises
in food and drug as well as aviation inspections. But see Hatfield, The Nonliability
of the Government for Certification of Aircraft, 17 FORUM 602 (1982) (arguing that
claims of negligent inspection are barred by the discretionary function exception to
the Federal Tort Claims Act). For a discussion of potential government liability in
the area of prescription drugs, see Stetler, Responsibility of the Food and Drug
Administration Under Federal Tort Claims Act, 72 DICK. L. REV. 580 (1968). For
a discussion of the government's scope of liability in constitutional violations, see
Wells & Eaton, Substantive Due Process and the Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18
GA. L. REV. 201 (1984), in which the authors argue that only tort claims against
the government which involve recklessness, motive, disproportion, and control deserve
constitutional protection.
"I Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, a United States court
would be barred from exerting jurisdiction over any Indian Government entity unless
the entity falls under an enumerated exception in the Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11
(1982). The exceptions are set forth in § 1605; however, the only exception applicable
to an Indian Government entity in the Bhopal case would be if the foreign government
has implicitly or explicitly waived its immunity to suit. Id. § 1605(a)(I). See also
Note, Foreign States Sued for Their Acts Abroad: A Uniform Analysis Under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 538 (1982). See generally
Note, Minimum Contacts Jurisdiction Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
12 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 209 (1982) (discussing the minimum contacts standard
applied to the "commercial activity" exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act).
"9 Diamond, supra note 31, at A6, col. I.
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court could find that the failure to maintain the machinery caused
the injuries resulting from the leak.
3. Multinational Enterprise Liability Theory
Finally, an Indian court may decide to apply the multinational
enterprise liability theory to the Bhopal case. This theory asserts that
a parent company can be held liable for tortious actions of its
subsidiaries, regardless of the degree of control the parent company
exercises. 120 This theory has been formally considered in neither a
United States nor an Indian court. Although in-depth consideration
of the multinational enterprise liability theory is beyond the scope
of this Note, a few observations are set forth which apply in both
the Indian and United States forums.
First, the doctrine of vicarious liability is present in both Indian 2'
and United States case law. 122 In both jurisdictions, the doctrine has
stemmed from early English common law.'23 The basic premise of
vicarious liability is that due to the relationship between two parties,
the negligence of the first party can be charged against the second
party even though the second party was not negligent.' 24
The respondeat superior concept behind vicarious liability is anal-
ogous to the multinational enterprise liability theory. This novel theory
120 Lewin, supra note 4, at D2, cols. 3-4. For a general discussion on multinational
corporations, see Fatouros, The Computer and the Mud Hut: Notes on Multinational
Enterprise in Developing Countries, 10 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 3225 (1971);
LaPalombara & Blank, Multinational Corporations and Developing Countries, 34
J. INT'L AFF. 119 (1980); Rangarajan, Structure of and Legal Control Over Mul-
tinational Corporations in a Mixed Economy, 15 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 453 (1975);
Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90
YALE L.J. 1 (1980).
2I See Bakshi, The Law of Torts, 17 A.S.I.L. 1, 3-5 (1981). The principle governing
the vicarious liability of the master was stated in Sitaram v. Santanuprasad, 1966
A.I.R. 1697 (S.C.) as follows:
A master is vicariously liable for the acts of his servant acting in the course
of his employment .... [Flor the master's liability to arise, the act must
be a wrongful act by the master or a wrongful and unauthorised [sic) mode
of doing some act authorised by the master.
Id.
122 PROSSER, supra note 79, § 69, at 499-501. The doctrine of vicarious liability has
been the subject of many law review articles and scholarly works. See, e.g., Laski,
The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105 (1916); Ferson, Bases for Master's
Liability and for Principal's Liability to Third Persons, 4 VAND. L. REV. 260 (1951).
23 The doctrine of vicarious liability began in England as early as 1708 in the
case of Hern v. Nichols, 91 Eng. Rep. 256 (1708).
124 The most familiar relationship in which vicarious liability arises is the liability
of a master for the torts of his servant. PROSSER, supra note 79, § 69, at 499-500.
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asserts that although the parent and subsidiary may be different
corporations,' 25 both are part of an aggregate of corporate entities
interconnected by a system of central control; 26 therefore, since the
two are connected in a single economic unit, liability can be shared. 127
The vicarious liability analogy is as follows: as the master controls
the economic unit and is responsible for the acts of his servant, the
centralized management of the multinational company controls the
aggregate unit, and thus is responsible for the actions of the subsid-
iary, even though not in complete control of those actions.
Additionally, the acceptance of this doctrine in a United States
court may have a chilling effect on American industry abroad. 21
Multinational corporations form subsidiaries in foreign countries to
establish limited liability for the parent company. 29 If this limited
125 See generally C. WALLACE, LEGAL CONTROL OF THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE
1 (1982) (the author states that the entities which compose a multinational enterprise
are individual corporations). The UCIL plant was incorporated under the laws of
India, see Robertson, Introduction to the Bhopal Symposium, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J.
269, 269 (1985), and the employees at the plant were Indian citizens. See Diamond,
1982 Inspector Says Indian Plant Was Below U.S. Safety Standards, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 12, 1984, at A8, col. 4.
126 See C. WALLACE, supra note 125, at 2.
127 See generally N. LATTIN, LATTIN ON CORPORATIONS §§ 11-13, 65-71 (2d ed.
1971). The multinational enterprise liability theory is contrary to the fundamental
purpose of establishing a corporation, that purpose being limited liability. The
subsidiary is established as a separate legal unit, solely responsible for its employees'
actions within the scope of their employment. Id. The multinational enterprise liability
theory avoids the concept of "piercing the corporate veil" by establishing liability
without a show of control by the parent company. See Westbrook, supra note 9,
at 323-24. Traditionally, the only way that Union Carbide could be held responsible
for the accident would be for the plaintiffs to show that Union Carbide was using
the UCIL plant to further its own, rather than the Bhopal plant's interests, or that
Union Carbide was abusing the corporate form simply to avoid any liability. See
N. LATTIN, supra, §§ 14, 18, at 72, 86. This traditional theory of holding another
party liable for the actions of the corporate entity is applied in both Indian and
American law. Westbrook, supra note 9, at 323.
,28 Broad, Gas Leak is Expected to Reduce Investment in Third World, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 12, 1984, at A8, cols. 1-2. American corporations may fear that liability
for all foreign subsidiary plant accidents will be thrust on them as parent companies.
To avoid potential liability, American corporations may decrease their industrial
activity in foreign countries. Id. Kenneth Rush, a former president of the Union
Carbide corporation and a former Deputy Secretary of State, has stated that the
Bhopal disaster "will probably reduce investments by multinational corporations in
the developing world." Id. at A8, col. 2.
,29 See generally N. LATTIN, supra note 127, § 11, at 65. For a discussion on the
liability of a multinational corporation for its subsidiaries, see Aronofsky, Piercing
the Transnational Corporate Veil: Trends, Developments, and the Need for Wide-
spread Adoption of Enterprise Analysis, 10 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 31 (1985).
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liability is stripped, United States-based multinationals may limit
foreign investment. Developing countries, in turn, would suffer if
American corporations decrease their international activities out of
fear of liability for future accidents. 30 Conversely, a large American
jury award in the Bhopal case may stimulate increased safety measures
in United States industry abroad.' This same chilling effect on
foreign investment, however, would not occur to the same degree if
an Indian court adopted the theory.3 2 In addition, because damage
awards would probably be lower in India,' United States industry
would be less concerned about future liability in foreign countries.
Finally, if the Union Carbide Corporation cannot be held liable
for the accident at the UCIL plant under the multinational enterprise
liability theory, or under a similar theory of vicarious liability,
13 4
many victims may be under-compensated or not compensated at all.'35
130 The UCIL plant in Bhopal was built under a common agreement in which the
multinational corporation shared ownership of the plant with the local government
of the developing country. Broad, supra note 128, at A8, col. 4. Union Carbide
was allowed to build its factory on government land at an annual rent of less than
$40 an acre, including taxes. Union Carbide's initial investment in 1969 of less than
$1 million in the UCIL plant grew to $25 million over the next 15 years. Pesticide
Plant, supra note 2, at 8, col. 1.
"I Broad, supra note 128, at A8, col. 3. According to Kenneth Rush, the cost
of doing business abroad is likely to increase as a result of the Bhopal disaster. The
Federal Government will increase its focus on the foreign operations of United States
corporations, which may in turn raise the costs these corporations spend on safety
devices. Id.
32 A decision by a United States court concerning minimum safety measures
required for international subsidiary plants of American corporations, or a ruling
on the level of control which would subject a parent company to liability for accidents
occurring at affiliate plants abroad, would probably have more of an impact on
United States corporations than would similar rulings coming from an Indian court.
"I' For a discussion on the damage award differences in United States and Indian
tort law, see infra notes 137-74 and accompanying text.
,14 See generally Diamond, supra note 29, at D3, col. I. Plaintiffs feel that because
of the degree of control the parent company exercised over the UCIL plant, the
parent company should be held responsible for the accident in Bhopal. This argument
was strengthened by an affidavit' of the former president of Carbide's agricultural
chemicals division, which stated that the parent company had ordered the use of
large MIC storage tanks over the objections of the Indian affiliate. The corporate
safety manual states that smaller containers are safer since they limit the amount
of MIC leakage. Id. For further discussion on Union Carbide's control over the
UCIL plant, see supra note 74 and accompanying text.
- The UCIL plant has been losing money since 1981 when it broke even. The
plant was equipped to produce 5,000 tons of pesticides a year. In 1982, however,
the plant produced only 2,308 tons; in 1983, only 1,647 tons; and an all time low
in 1984 of less than 1,000 tons. Company sources said the 1984 loss was close to
$4 million. Pesticide Plant, supra note 2, at 1, col. 5. The drop in sales resulted
in a lower net worth for the UCIL plant, and due to the plant's unprofitability,
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
The UCIL plant does not carry assets sufficient to absorb a large
judgment without relying on the deep pocket of its parent. 3 6 Such
under-compensation, however, may not suffice in persuading a court
to adopt a theory which would allow actions to be brought against
the parent company every time an injury occurs at a foreign subsid-
iary's plant. Indeed, the promise of limited liability is the very reason
why multinational corporations often use the parent-subsidiary form.
The substantive body of tort law in India is fully adequate to
handle the Bhopal litigation. An Indian court could apply each of
the three theories of liability discussed above. Case precedent on the
doctrine of negligence abounds in India. In addition, Indian courts
could adopt the theories of strict and absolute liability, and follow
English precedent in applying these theories. Furthermore, an Indian
court could adopt the multinational enterprise liability theory to hold
the parent company liable for the claims. Doctrinally, therefore, the
American forum offers no significant advantage for Bhopal victims.
B. Damages
A second important aspect of litigation which contrasts the Indian
legal system with the legal system of the United States is the level
of damages awarded in tort suits. Traditionally, compensation in
Indian tort suits has been minimal compared to jury awards for
plaintiffs involved in similar cases in the United States. Nevertheless,
elements of recovery are in fact very similar in the two countries,
although Indian courts do not offer punitive damages. Recognizing
that the difference in the levels of awards should be explained in
terms of contrasting social standards, rather than legal doctrine, is
essential to an objective comparison of the forums.
1. Indian Courts
Damage awards in Indian tort suits are traditionally quite low by
the parent company has considered dismantling it and selling the parts. Riley, supra
note 72, at 11, col. 2. A lower net worth in turn results in less money available to
satisfy any tort judgments.
'1 Westbrook, supra note 9, at 328. "[I]t is quite possible that Carbide India is
or will be insolvent when its financial responsibility for the disaster has been de-
termined." Id. Under the Companies Act, the Carbide India corporation could
initiate a liquidation bankruptcy of the company under Indian law. The Companies
Act (INDIA), 1956, pt. VII, reprinted in, 1 M. SETHNA, INDIAN COMPANY LAW 853
(7th ed. 1967). Indian liquidators could then file a petition under the United States
Bankruptcy Code to complete the Indian bankruptcy proceeding. Unless a suit can
then be filed against the Union Carbide Corporation, those victims who had not
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United States standards.'37 One reason for the small awards is that
Indian judges place little legal premium on injury and death.' An-
other reason is that Indian citizens generally do not expect legal
remedies when agricultural and industrial accidents occur. 3 9 Instead,
many Indians believe that disasters are "an incontrovertible part of
,their preordained fate.'"''
Following industrial accidents, the Indian Government often pro-
vides its citizens with public relief as an alternative mode of com-
pensation to lawsuits.14' A review of tort suits filed in personal accident
cases reveals only meager awards; 42 therefore, Union Carbide's com-
pensatory damage payments would no doubt be reduced substantially
been compensated would lose any claim against either the Union Carbide Corporation
or the UCIL plant. Westbrook, supra note 9, at 328-29.
-" See, e.g., Krishna Gounder v. Narasingam Pillai, 1962 A.I.R. 309 (Mad. H.C.)
(award of 5,000 rupees, approximately $400, given for loss of expectation of life);
Marine and General Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Balkrishna, 1977 A.I.R. 53 (Bom.)
(medical surgeon awarded the equivalent of $17,925 after being seriously injured in
a car accident caused by the negligence of the other driver).
" Dhavan, supra note 49, at 301.
,19 Id. at 302. In addition, the enormous court fees keep many citizens from
bringing tort claims. Consequently, these citizens often do -not rely on the legal
system to redress wrongs. Galanter, supra note 40, at 274. Furthermore, there is a
very low level of legal awareness among the general public of India. Bakshi, supra
note 116, at 339. For example, no lawsuits were brought following the crash of an
Air India 747 which killed hundreds, nor following the deaths of 365 persons upon
drinking contaminated liquor in Bangalore in 1982. Galanter, supra note 40, at 280
n.33.
,40 Dhavan, supra note 49, at 302.
,4, Id. Government payments promote the idea that the accident was the result
of fate. Disaster funds and rehabilitation plans are initiated while dignitaries visit
the victims offering sympathy. Id. Under the Bhopal relief plan, a reported 75%
of the population, over 700,000 people, are receiving free rations of wheat, rice,
sugar, and cooking oil. In addition, the state government has established dozens of
clinics and mobile hospitals to supplement existing medical facilities. Kramer, supra
note 1, at 1, col. I. See generally Galanter, supra note 40, at 280. Since the Bhopal
disaster, the Indian Government has spent nearly $40 million on relief efforts.
Approximately half of this money has been spent in direct cash grants and food
assistance, and the other half has been spent on job-training programs to teach
those victims with breathing problems new skills such as television repairs and soap-
making. Weisman, supra note 52, at 18, col. 1.
To avoid over-medication, the Indian Government divided Bhopal into seven
districts, each with a central medication dispensary. All victims have been given a
code number and yellow record card to use in obtaining medicine. Before imple-
mentation of this system, medical distribution was in a chaos as gas victims went
from dispensary to dispensary to get relief, and no records were being kept. Id. at
18, col. 2.
142 See, e.g., Bhanumati Vithaldas Gor v. Magabhai Dhulabhai, 1981 A.I.R. 182
(Guj.) ($5,625 in compensation given to the widow of a 29-year old school teacher
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if the Bhopal case is tried in India rather than in the United States.143
An Indian court will follow Indian case law to determine the level
of compensation available to Bhopal victims.'" One overriding policy
in Indian tort law is the prohibition of punitive damage awards in
personal injury or wrongful death cases. 145 By failing to adopt the
policies behind punitive damages,' 46 Indian courts have succeeded in
keeping damage awards relatively low. Rather than using punitive
damages in civil cases to deter wrongful conduct, the Indian justice
system often brings criminal charges against those responsible for
injuries and deaths. 47
In the Bhopal litigation, however, awarding punitive damages to
the Indian victims could establish a new precedent. 4 The Bhopal
disaster justifies an award of punitive damages to deter wrongful
conduct by large corporations operating in India. In addition, Indian
killed in an automobile accident); Lachhman Singh v. Gurmit Kaur, 1979 A.1.R.
50 (P. & H.) (parents, widow, and four minor children of the deceased were awarded
$1,875 as compensation, and the court refused to give further compensation based
on love, affection, mental agony, or other such considerations). Id. at 50.
'43 Victims, supra note 37, at 133. "If Union Carbide succeeds in moving all the
cases to India, its eventual liability will be minimal-certainly under $75 million,
by the most liberal calculation." Id.
'- Bhopal: City of Death, supra note 1, at 18.
'- Id. Courts in India do not award punitive damages in personal injury or
wrongful death cases because the courts want to "avoid any windfall to claimants."
Galanter, supra note 40, at 276. To ensure that the claimant will not benefit from
the death, the court also considers the claimant's share of inheritance from the
deceased. Dhavan, supra note 49, at 301; see also Victims, supra note 37, at 132
(citing a conversation the author had with Narasimha Swamy, a former Delhi
University law professor); cf. Galanter, supra note 40, at 276. Galanter states that
although punitive damages are referred to in India as exemplary damages, they are
"almost unknown in practice." Id.
"6 For a brief discussion on the policies underlying punitive damages in United
States tort law, see infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text; see also Ellis, Fairness
and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAt. L. REV. 1 (1982).
'41 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the priority
of criminal charges over civil claims in India. After the Bhopal disaster, Warren
Anderson, President of Union Carbide, was arrested in Bhopal and held on charges
of "negligence and corporate liability" in connection with the gas leak. Other
employees of the UCIL plant have also been detained for questioning. Mr. Anderson
has since been released. Hazarika, supra note 44, at 1, col. 3. Another leading
lawyer feels that criminal charges could possibly be brought against UCIL employees
relating to conspiracy and murder under §§ 120 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code.
Bhopal: City of Death, supra note 1, at 18.
,48 Bhopal District Court Judge Yadan has stated that because an Indian court
has never before tried a toxic tort suit, a different measure of damages could possibly
be devised and disbursed to the victims. "We can grant any amount," stated Judge
Yadan; however, one of his higher estimates was still less than $40,000. Victims,
supra note 37, at 132.
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courts have never heard a toxic tort suit. Thus, the courts may decide
that where serious accidents such as the MIC leak at Bhopal have
potential for future occurrences, punitive damages are proper.' 4
9
Even so, an Indian court could still provide an adequate remedy
for the plaintiffs without awarding punitive damages. At least four
American states have refused to award punitive damages in tort
cases, 150 yet plaintiffs in those states receive adequate remedies by
way of compensation awards. Should Indian courts decline an award
of punitive damages, victims can still be adequately compensated via
the traditional method of awarding tort claimants in India.
This traditional manner of awarding compensatory damages is
similar to the compensatory award system in the United States. In
personal injury cases, damages are based on "the nature of the injury,
the expenditure incurred in medical treatment, loss of earning ca-
pacity, and the pain suffered."'' In the case of a fatal accident,
Indian courts have based awards on both loss of consortium to a
spouse' and on the loss of earning capacity over the projected
working life of the deceased.' 3 In addition, Indian courts recently
14 Section 908 of the Second Restatement of Torts states: "Punitive damages are
damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded against a person
to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from
similar conduct in the future." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1965).
Most United States jurisdictions have doctrines allowing punitive damages in some
form "to punish a defendant who commits an aggravated or outrageous act of
misconduct against the plaintiff and to deter the defendant and others from similar
misbehavior in the future." Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against
Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1982).
110 United States courts which have specifically rejected punitive damages include
the state courts of Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Wisconsin. PROSSER,
supra note 79, § 2, at 9 n.20.
- Bhopal: City of Death, supra note 1, at 18; see also Rehana v. Ahmedabad
Mun. Transp. Serv., 1976 A.I.R. 37 (Guj.), where the court determined which
categories of general damages could be awarded in a personal injury case. These
categories included: (1) personal suffering and loss of enjoyment of life; (2) actual
pecuniary loss resulting in any expenses reasonably incurred by the plaintiff; and
(3) the probable future loss of income by reason of incapacity or diminished capacity
for work. Id. at 46.
152 See, for example, K. Narayana v. P. Venugopala, 1976 A.I.R. 184 (A.P.),
where the High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that under the provisions of the
Fatal Accidents Act, damages could be awarded for the loss of consortium in cases
involving the death of the spouse in the accident. Id. at 191.
- See, e.g., Jaimal Singh v. Jawala Devi, 1976 A.I.R. 127 (Delhi) (High Court
of Delhi gave compensation to the wife of the deceased based on the monthly income
of the deceased, and applied the principle that damages are to be assessed on the
basis of the plaintiff's loss at the date of the judgment); cf. Victims, supra note
37, at 132 (states that the spouse of a person is usually awarded only one-half of
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have compensated disabled victims for the loss of enjoyment of life. 54
Although the mechanics for awarding injured claimants in India
is similar to the compensatory system in the United States, the actual
awards are still smaller. One reason awards are smaller in Indian
tort cases is that the earning capacity of the average Indian worker
pales in comparison to the income of the average American.' A
second reason stems from the cultural value Indian courts place on
pain and suffering; Indian judges routinely reduce compensation for
pain and suffering to insure that plaintiffs do not prosper by their
claim. 5 6 But because the lower level of awards in India results from
India's unique cultural standards, its existing damage award system
can still compensate the Bhopal victims adequately.'5 7
2. United States Courts
Most United States courts'58 can award both compensatory and
punitive damages 59 in tort cases. Compensation awards include med-
ical expenses, lost earnings, and pain and suffering. Some states allow
the victim's income as compensation, which is often further cut by 20% "to account
for the possibility that the victim might have died early anyway"). Id.
"I See, e.g., Mohamed Hanif Dallu v. Lunkaran Ganpatram Sharma, (1980) 21
G.L.R..412.
'I Most laborers in India make no more than 200 rupees a month, or about $15.
This figure represents an average yearly wage among Indian laborers of $180. If
each victim was awarded $10,000, he or she would receive yearly wages for 30 years
with an additional $4,600 for pain and suffering. Many victims would not have to
work for the rest of their lives. See Victims, supra note 37, at 132.
116 Galanter, supra note 40, at 276.
This view is adopted by the author. An Indian court could award victims for
pain and suffering and, in death cases, for the projected earning capacity of the
deceased according to the living standards of the victims in Bhopal. The average
income in Bhopal is extremely low, and many of the victims were unemployed, or
only intermittently employed. These victims should be compensated according to
their own living standards. The purpose of the Bhopal litigation should not be to
make "millionaires out of people who live in huts and tents," but rather the purpose
should be to compensate fully the victims for each injury and fatality caused by
the gas leak. Adler, supra note 29, at 28. Indian courts have adequately compensated
tort claimants in the past, and the size and parties of the Bhopal litigation should
not suddenly render the damage award system of India inadequate. The Indian
victims are no less deserving of compensation than any other human being who is
injured wrongfully; however, the system of compensating pain and injury deals with
a monetary award, and the value of a monetary award is governed by the location
of the individual. Id. at 57; see also Non Causus Belli, Wall St. J., Dec. 12, 1984,
at 30, cols 1-2.
"I See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
"9 PROSSER, supra note 79, § 2, at 14. Most American courts hold that punitive
damages may be withheld at the discretion of thejury or trial judge. Punitive
damages are generally seen as a type of windfall to the plaintiff, and not a matter
of right.
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additional compensation for mental distress accompanying immediate
physical injury.' 60 In wrongful death cases, compensation is awarded
according to the pecuniary value the beneficiary could have expected
to receive from the deceased, barring death.1 61 This value includes
speculation on such matters as life expectancy, income, habits and
health of the deceased, past contributions to the family, -and the
probability of increased earnings and contributions in the future.
162
Punitive damages are usually available in cases where the defendant's
actions have "been intentional and deliberate, and have the character
of outrage frequently associated with crime." 63 Thus, the social policy
behind punitive damages is to deter wrongful conduct and to punish
the wrongdoer. 164
Although punitive damages serve a useful purpose, the impact of
such damages in mass tort suits may be counter-productive. For
example, within the last three years, two large American corporations
have filed for reorganization under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 65 as a result of punitive damages awarded in thousands of cases
brought against them.'6 In these two situations, multiple punitive
damages have produced negative results in at least two ways. First,
60 Id. § 54, at 363. The author reasons that "[wlith a cause of action established
by the physical harm, 'parasitic' damages are awarded, and it is considered that
there is sufficient assurance that the mental injury is not feigned." Id.
161 Id. § 127, at 953; see, e.g., Hertz v. McDowell, 358 Mo. 383, 214 S.W.2d 546
(1948); American Barge Line Co. v. Leatherman's Adm'x, 306 Ky. 284, 206 S.W.2d
955 (1947).
'62 PROSSER, supra note 79, § 127, at 953.
13 Id. § 2, at 9.
I6 Owen, Civil Punishment And The Public Good, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 103, 109
(1982). Professor Owen also argues that punitive damages are fair because they
compensate the victim, including payment of the victim's costs of litigation; see also
Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MIcH. L. REV. 1257,
1295-97 (1976).
165 Specifically these companies filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (1982).
'66 See Debtor's Petition Under Chapter 11B, In re Johns-Manville Corp., No.
82B11656-116-76 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 1982). Johns-Manville is the world's
largest producer of asbestos with a solid history of profits; but more than 16,000
asbestos-damage suits put the giant corporation into bankruptcy court. Comment,
Manville Corporation and the "Good Faith" Standard for Reorganization Under
the Bankruptcy Code, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 1467, 1468-69 (1983); see also Comment,
The Manville Corporation Bankruptcy: An Abuse of the Judicial Process?, 11
PEPPERDINE L. REV. 151 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Manville Bankruptcy]. In late
August of 1985, another large American corporation, A.H. Robins of Richmond,
Virginia, manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield birth control device, filed a similar
bankruptcy petition. See Robins Runs for Shelter, supra note 7, at 32.
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without a reorganization plan, 167 future plaintiffs will be deprived of
receiving any compensation from these companies. 61 In addition, the
pbssibility of punitive damages reduces the number of policies which
insurance companies are willing to write, and decreases the amount
of coverage these companies are willing to offer. 169 If punitive damages
are awarded in multiple cases arising from the Bhopal disaster, 70
Union Carbide may similarly find itself in bankruptcy court, or
without insurance to cover future losses.
Damage awards would undoubtedly be higher if the Bhopal liti-
gation is heard in the United States, in part because of the availability
of punitive damages.' 7' Additionally, even if the case were tried in
the United States under Indian law, 72 an American jury would likely
award more to the gas-leak victims than would an Indian judge.173
Finally, Judge Keenan's decision as to whether an Indian court could
provide adequate compensation to the victims if the traditionally low
damage award standard is followed stands as a key factor in the
forum non conveniens ruling.' 74
,67 Id. Under the Johns-Manville reorganization plan developed in bankruptcy
court, a $2.5 billion fund was set aside for asbestos victims with the view that
Johns-Manville would be able to emerge from bankruptcy within a year or two.
"'6 See Manville Bankruptcy, supra note 166, at 164.
1 See Pomerantz, Products Liability Insurance in the New Industrial Revolution,
686 INs. L.J. 129, 136-37 (1980). To cover their liability in mass-tort suits, insurance
companies have been significantly increasing rates and directing the available capacity
of insurance "to those lines of insurance most profitable." Id. at 136. This in turn
causes manufacturers to raise prices to consumers, ultimately resulting in the average
citizen paying for a corporation's insurance coverage. See also Belli, Punitive Dam-
ages: Their History, Their Use and Their Worth in Present-Day Society, 49 U.M.K.C.
L. REV. 1, 7 (1980). For a general discussion of the insurance issues connected with
mass tort suits, see Epstein, The Legal and Insurance Dynamics of Mass Tort
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 475 (1984); Mansfield, Asbestos: The Cases and the
Insurance Problem, 15 FORUM 860 (1979).
170 Although all the cases are consolidated in one court at present, they may be
remanded to their respective courts after the pre-trial process, and more cases may
then be filed. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1982).
17, See supra notes 163-70 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of punitive
damages in American tort law.
"72 For a discussion of the choice of law issue, and the possibility of the Bhopal
.case being tried under Indian law in an American court, see infra notes 177-94 and
accompanying text.
'" See supra notes 137-57 for a discussion of the low value of damage awards in
Indian tort cases.
,74 For a discussion of the importance of the adequacy of compensation in a
foreign court as it applies to the issue of forum non conveniens, see infra notes
248-52 and accompanying text.
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C. Procedural Aspects
In addition to differences in the nature of tort law and damage
awards in Indian and United States forums, the administrative pro-
cedures of these two forums should also be contrasted. These pro-
cedural differences will be considered in the New York court's ruling
on forum non conveniens. 75 If the procedural differences are im-
portant enough to render India an inadequate forum to hear the
litigation, the forum non conveniens motion will be denied. 7 6
1. Choice of Law
If the Bhopal litigation is heard in India, the choice of law question
presents little difficulty; the district court of Bhopal would apply
Indian law. The Indian rules of civil procedure allow a suit to be
brought against a corporation where that corporation carries on
business.1 77 Jurisdiction over the parent company would be based on
agency notions. Thus, the American-based Union Carbide Corpo-
ration could be subject to suit in India if the Bhopal court determines
that UCIL was acting as the agent of Union Carbide and that the
cause of action arose from UCIL's activities. 78 Union Carbide would
therefore be subjected to Indian law in Bhopal's district court.
If the Bhopal case is heard in the United States, however, choice
of law becomes a more difficult question. Whether an American court
would apply Indian law, 79 or the law of a particular American state,
is debatable.18 0 To resolve this dispute, it is important to consider
," See text accompanying notes 246-47 for a discussion of the factors to be
considered in Judge Keenan's ruling on the forum non conveniens motion. The
choice of law question will be directly considered as a public interest factor in the
case. In addition, interlocutory appeals, class actions, filing fees, and the absence
of jury trials, will be considered in the overall decision as to whether India provides
an adequate alternative forum.
176 The court must find that an adequate alternative forum exists before it will
grant a forum non conveniens motion. An adequate forum will allow the plaintiff
to re-file his claim, offers a substantive theory under which the plaintiff can recover,
and subjects the defendant to service of process. See infra notes 248-52 and accom-
panying text.
'" T. AIYAR, I MULLA ON THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (India) § 19, at 137
(1965) [hereinafter cited as MULLA]. This provision would apply to the Bhopal district
court's jurisdiction over UCIL.
,71 Id. § 20, n.23; see also Swaminathan v. Somasundaram (1938) 61 Indian L.R.
(Mad.) 1080; Neelakanda v. Kunju (1935) 68 Mad. L.J. 506.
' See Non Causus Beli, supra note 157, at 30, col. 1.
80 See Weinberg, supra note 77, at 309. The author states that if the Bhopal
cases were heard in the United States, the court would apply "the law of some
state" and try the cases under United States law. Id. However, Weinberg concludes
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the choice of law rules of the state in which the case is heard.,'
Assuming denial of the forum non conveniens motion, and assuming
only a single case is tried in the United States,8 2 New York is the
likely forum. 8
3
Any case or cases arising from the Bhopal disaster could be brought
in a United States federal district court in which Union Carbide is
subject to jurisdiction8 4 based on diversity of citizenship.8 5 In Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., ' 6 the Supreme Court held
that when a federal court considers a choice of law question in a
diversity case, it must follow the choice of law rules of the forum
state. ' 7 Thus, if a single case is heard in New York's Southern District
Court, New York choice of law rules would apply. 88
If New York choice of law rules are used, then the federal court
would apply the law of that place which is the "center of gravity"
in the litigation.8 9 The "center of gravity," or "grouping of contacts"
that liability could be determined under both Indian and United States law, and
therefore the distinction is unimportant. Id.
," At least seven theories are used by various jurisdictions in deciding choice of
law questions. These theories are discussed in Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of
Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L. REV. 521 (1983).
82 The Indian Government seeks to sue in the United States as the victims' sole
representative using the doctrine of parens patriae. If successful, the Indian Gov-
ernment's action against Union Carbide will be the only case tried. See generally
Westbrook, supra note 9, at 330 (discussing the obstacles facing parens patriae
representation in the United States).
"I New York would seem to be the likely forum because the Indian Government
filed its suit against Union Carbide in that state.
,-- 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1982), provides that a corporation is subject to jurisdiction
in any state in which it is incorporated or where it has its principal place of business.
Union Carbide is incorporated in the state of New York and has its principal place
of business in Connecticut. Recent Development, Jurisdiction and Conflicts of Law
- The Bhopal Litigation, 26 HARv. INT'L L.J. 637, 644 (1985). Union Carbide may
be subject to jurisdiction under the long-arm statutes of other states in which it
carries on business. See generally J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE, & A. MILLER, CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 3.13 (1985).
"1 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2), (4) (1982). The federal court must then decide whether
Union Carbide is subject to jurisdiction in the state in which the suit is brought.
See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
86 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
187 Id. at 496. This holding was an extension of the famous Supreme Court case,
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Erie Court held that "[e]xcept
in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law
to be applied in any case is the law of the State." Id. at 78.
88 If only one case was tried, that case would likely line up the Indian Government
against Union Carbide. If Judge Keenan decides that each claim can be tried
separately, all claims will be transferred back to their original forums. See supra
notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
8 Kay, supra note 181, at 525-26. The theory considers the acts of the parties
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approach, was adopted by the New York Court of Appeals in 1954
in Auten v. Auten.' 90 The purpose of the "center of gravity" approach
is to give "the place having the most interest in the problem para-
mount control over the legal issues arising out of a particular factual
context."' 9' In Auten the court used English law to determine the
rights of English citizens under a contract entered into in New York.
In 1963, the New York Court of Appeals extended the center of
gravity approach to tort suits in the case of Babcock v. Jackson. 92
Following Babcock on the choice of law issue, the New York federal
court would likely find that India is the center of gravity in the
Bhopal case for several reasons. First, the disaster involved injuries
to Indian citizens, and the families of those killed are in India. Second,
employees of the plant were Indian citizens. Third, the site of the
accident is in India. And finally, investigations of the disaster are
being undertaken by Indian officials. 93 As a result, the federal court
should apply Indian law to any case arising out of the Bhopal
disaster. 19
2. Filing Fees
A second procedural distinction between the Indian and American
forums concerns filing fees. 95 To reduce the amount of litigation in
involved in relation to the states or countries involved, and then applies the law of
that state or country with which the facts are in most intimate contact. Id. at 526.
308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
Id. at 161, 124 N.E.2d at 102.
92 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 473 (1963), on remand, 40
Misc.2d 757, 243 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1963). In tort cases involving the measure of recovery
in wrongful death suits, charitable immunity, and contribution in interstate workers'
compensation cases, New York courts still follow the center of gravity theory when
a conflict of law arises. Kay, supra note 181, at 535.
' The Auten court considered similar factual patterns in concluding that it should
invoke English law. Auten at 161-62, 124 N.E.2d at 102-03.
'19 The choice of law theories followed in other states may support application
of United States tort law in the Bhopal litigation. For example, in Hurtado v.
Superior Court, 11 Cal.3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974), the California
Supreme Court adopted the governmental interest theory for conflict questions. This
theory states that a forum "should investigate the foreign law only when asked to
do so by the parties, and should apply that law only in cases in which the forum
had no interest in applying its own law." Kay, supra note 181, at 539-40. Thus, a
court following the governmental interest theory would probably apply American
law in the Bhopal litigation. First, the plaintiffs would not request Indian law, and
further, the court could find some state interest to support applying state law.
19 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914 (1982). Filing fees are costs paid to a court in order to
have a complaint filed and subsequently heard by the court.
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India during the 1800's, the British passed the Indian Court Fees Act
of 1870.96 This act required a citizen to pay a fee to the court before
a civil case would be heard.' 97 In a suit for damages or compensation,
the amount of the fee was determined by the amount claimed. 9 In
general, the percentage of the award paid as court fees decreased as
the amount of the award increased.'9 Presently, court fees for an
award which exceeds 100,000 rupees, or $8,000, is between five and
six percent of the amount claimed. 2°°
Under normal circumstances these court fees would prohibit most
if not all of the Bhopal victims from filing a claim with the Bhopal
district court. 2°' The Madhya Pradesh Government, however, has
waived the usual court fees for any claim arising out of the Bhopal
case.20 2 As a result, the Court Fees Act is no longer a deterrent to
the Bhopal litigation taking place in India. 20 3
Similarly, court fees would probably not deter Bhopal victims from
filing suit in an American court. United States courts require only
a nominal fee compared to the percentage-based filing fees in India.2 0°4
Instead of paying a certain percentage of the award to the court,
plaintiffs in the United States often disburse a percentage of the
award to their lawyers in the form of contingency fees. 205 As a result
of the waiving of court fees in India, and the low filing fees in the
'9 The Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), 6 INDIA A.I.R. MANUAL 1191 (3d ed. 1970).
,97 Galanter, supra note 40, at 274.
198 M. BASU, THE COURT FEES ACT AND THE SUITS VALUATION ACT 76 (1965).
'- See Galanter, supra note 40, at 274.
200 Id. The Indian rupee is currently worth approximately $0.08. Id. at n.7.
201 Stewart, supra note 40, at 28, col. 1.
202 Victims, supra note 37, at 130. The fees were officially waived by the state
government in a notification dated December 20, 1984. Galanter, supra note 40, at
283.
203 Id. No further claims have been filed, however, since the Indian Government
passed the ordinance selecting itself as sole representative of the victims. See also
supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
204 For example, before filing any civil case or proceeding in a Georgia superior
court, a deposit of $20 must be paid. This deposit is the total amount owed to the
court for bringing the suit. O.C.G.A. § 15-6-77 (1985). When instituting a civil
action, suit, or proceeding in any United States district court, the plaintiff is required
to pay a $60 filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (1982). Conversely, Indian courts require
a nonrefundable filing fee of up to 5% of the total damages sought. Stewart, supra
note 40, at 28, col. 1.
205 Plaintiffs' lawyers in the Bhopal litigation are reportedly seeking anywhere
from 20-500 contingency fees, although some have refused to set a figure this early.
See Victims, supra note 37, at 134-35. If the cases remain consolidated, however,
the court will award a mass lump sum with attorneys' fees included in that sum.
In the recent Agent Orange litigation, attorneys' fees amounted to less than 10%
of the original settlement figure. Weinberg, supra note 77, at 317-18.
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United States, the Bhopal victims will not be deterred financially
from entering complaints in either Indian or American forums.
3. Jury Trials
A third distinction between the two jurisdictions concerns the use
of juries in civil cases. Indian law does not provide for juries in civil
cases. 2°6 Instead, complaints and arguments are heard by a single
judge who pronounces his verdict. 20 7 The judge also has the right to
recall and examine the witnesses at trial.20 8 These judges tend to keep
tort damage awards low in an effort to avoid providing a windfall
to claimants.2 09
Conversely, United States law guarantees the right to trial by jury. 210
The seventh amendment to the United States Constitution states that
in all civil suits, "the right of trial by jury shall be preserved. ' ' 211
Recent cases show that juries in civil cases have been very willing to
award extremely large punitive damages in cases involving large cor-
porate defendants.21 2 Thus, a jury in a United States court, using the
weapon of jaunitive damages, 23 may compensate victims in far greater
206 Galanter, supra note 40, at 276. Indian law follows English common law in
allowing civil actions to be tried before a judge alone; however, England now
recognizes a right to trial by jury in cases of fraud, libel, slander, malicious pros-
ecution, false imprisonment, seduction and breach of a marriage promise. Although
the court has discretion to allow trial by jury in other civil actions, there is no
universal right to trial by jury in England. E. WADE & A. BRADLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 309 (8th ed. 1970).
207 See MULLA, supra note 177, order 20, rule 1, "at 913. Before enactment of the
government's ordinance, the cases arising from the Bhopal disaster were being heard
by Judge Virenda Singh Yadan. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. At the
time, Judge Yadan was presiding over 2,000 separate claims. Victims, supra note
37, at 130.
20. MULLA, supra note 177, order 18, rule 17, at 908.
21 Galanter, supra note 40, at 276.
20 In civil cases, however, the parties must affirmatively request a trial by jury
or it is deemed waived. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(d).
" U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
212 See, e.g., Malandris v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 703 F.2d 1152
(10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 92 (1983) (punitive damage
award of $3 million in a fraud case reduced to $1 million by the appeals court);
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981)
(original jury award of $125 million in punitive damages ultimately reduced to $3.5
million); Rosener v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 740, 168 Cal. Rptr.
237 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 1051 (1981) (appellate court reduced $10
million punitive damage award to $2.5 million in contract fraud case); Pennzoil Co.
v. Texaco, Inc., No. 84-05905 (Harris County Civ. Ct. Nov. 19, 1985) (jury award
of $10.53 billion in a securities fraud case, $3 billion representing punitive damages).
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amounts than would an Indian judge working under a legal system
which merely attempts to compensate victims for losses suffered.214
For this reason, the procedural distinction of trial by jury could have
substantial practical impact on the outcome of the Bhopal case.
4. Interlocutory Appeals
Review of interlocutory appeals is a fourth procedural distinction
between the United States and Indian forums. Interlocutory relief is
extremely easy to obtain in India; 215 an unlimited number of issues
may be appealed at almost any point during a proceeding 216 causing
great backlog in India's high courts. 217 Because Indian lawyers so
jealously guard this interlocutory procedure, the backlog increases
each year.2"'
An interlocutory order is much more difficult to obtain in an
American court. United States appeals courts have statutory juris-
diction over only four types of interlocutory orders. 219 Any other
issue in which a party seeks interlocutory review must be certified
by the district court judge hearing the case. 220 The judge should certify
only those issues dealing with a controlling question of law, rather
than any matter within the discretion of the district court.22'
Although the interlocutory appeal is a matter of concern in the
Bhopal litigation, the problem can be avoided by establishing a special
panel of judges in India to hear only the accident claims. 222 This
213 American juries would only be able to award punitive damages if United States
law is applied. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
214 See generally Dhavan, supra note 49, at 300-02 (discussion of damages available
under Indian law).
2,- Id. at 297.
216 Stewart, supra note 40, at 28, col. 2. The interlocutory appeal is seen as an
important due process right in Indian courts. Id.
217 A case taken completely through the Indian legal system may take decades
before final disposition. Id. at 28, col. 1.
218 Indian lawyers have been known to go on strike when the High Court justices
have tried to make interlocutory relief more difficult to obtain. Dhavan, supra note
49, at 297. The Indian Supreme Court is so burdened with the interlocutory appeals
process that it spends half its time "admitting" cases for final hearing of an
interlocutory appeal. Id.
21 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a), (c) (1982). The four situations in which a United States
court of appeals has statutory jurisdiction include the following: (1) an interlocutory
order pertaining to an injunction; (2) a judgment in a civil action for patent
infringement; (3) interlocutory decrees determining the rights and liabilities of the
parties to admiralty cases; and (4) interlocutory orders appointing receivers or refusing
orders to wind up receiverships. Id.
220 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982).
22 C. WRIGHT, supra note 13, § 102, at 714.
222 See Diamond, supra note 66, at 43, col. 5.
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panel could suspend the right to interlocutory review while the cases
are being heard. Due process could be preserved by allowing a final
appeal, but only after a complete disposition of all claims. Without
a special tribunal, interlocutory appeals could pose significant delays
in the adjudication of the Bhopal claims in India.
5. Class Actions
The final distinction to be drawn between the American and Indian
legal systems deals with class actions. The class action is unknown
in India and would probably be impossible to maintain in the Bhopal
litigation. 223 In 1978, the scene was set in India for initiation of a
class action when a plane crash killed hundreds of Indians near
Bombay;224 however, neither a class action nor any individual suit
arose from the accident. 225
To contrast, the class action is available in the United States. The
class action consolidates the claims of persons injured under circum-
stances which give rise to similar litigation issues. 226 The purpose of
the class action is to allow individuals with similar claims to resolve
those claims in a single proceeding, thus saving the time, effort, and
expense involved in duplicative litigation.2 27
Federal courts, however, are reluctant to certify class actions in
the mass tort context. 221 One main reason for this reluctance is that
class actions are inappropriate in mass tort suits since different damage
and liability issues exist with respect to each individual plaintiff. 22
9
Although the liability issues would be the same for each Bhopal
victim, the damage issues may differ significantly from victim to
victim. 230 Reviewing the decisions of federal courts in this area leads
223 To date, no class actions have been reported in Indian case law.
224 See Stewart, supra note 40, at 1, col. 1.
225 Id.
226 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23. This rule lists the requirements for certification, FED.
R. CIv. P. 23(a), and the types of claims that can be certified for class action, FED.
R. Crv. P. 23(b).
227 Note, Federal Mass Tort Class Actions: A Step Toward Equity and Efficiency,
47 ALB. L. REV. 1180, 1180-81 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Mass Tort Class Actions].
2I See Id. at 1183. For a discussion in favor of class actions in mass tort claims,
see Note, Class Actions in New York: Recovery for Personal Injury in Mass Tort
Cases, 30 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1187 (1979).
229 Mass Tort Class Actions, supra note 227, at 1183-84. Two other reasons have
been set forth to explain judicial hesitancy in certifying mass torts as class actions:
(1) the notion that each individual is free to determine how to enforce his own
rights; and (2) the possibility of being affected without being provided a day in
court violates the traditional Anglo-American concept of justice. Id. at 1184.
230 Union Carbide attorney Bud Holman insists that if the claims are tried in the
United States and no settlement can be reached, every Indian plaintiff will be required
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to a conclusion that the Bhopal case probably would not be certified
for class action.2"' This procedural distinction would therefore have
no impact in the Bhopal litigation.
Although certain procedural distinctions do exist between the Indian
and the American legal systems, these distinctions would not prohibit
an Indian court from processing the Bhopal claims fairly. A strong
argument can be made that wherever the claims are brought, the
same substantive law will be applied. In that vein, India would provide
the preferable forum because Indian courts could apply their own
law. In addition, waiving the Court Fees Act for all accident claims
removed a large procedural obstacle in India.
The doctrinal propriety of an Indian forum is further seen in two
additional procedural issues. First, a potential procedural advantage
of the American forum, availability of the class action, would prob-
ably not be used since each damage claim would require a separate
trial. In addition, the potential problem of interlocutory appeals and
backlog in Indian courts could be avoided by establishing a special
tribunal for the Bhopal litigation. Thus, India's forum is adequate
on both substantive and procedural grounds, and is therefore capable
of providing a proper remedy for each Bhopal claimant.
IV. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
Having recognized the substantive and procedural distinctions be-
tween the Indian and American legal systems, this Note now addresses
the threshold issue in the Bhopal litigation, forum non conveniens.
The federal court's ruling on this issue will not only decide the final
forum for the accident claims,232 but will also impact the damage
to appear in court. Holman maintains that separate damage trials are a fundamental
requirement of due process. Adler, supra note 29, at 62.
231 In the following mass tort cases, district courts refused to certify for class
action: In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)
(defoliant chemical); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1979), vacated,
100 F.R.D. 336 (D. Mass. 1983) (DES); Marchesi v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 68 F.R.D.
500 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (airplane disaster); Yandle v. PPG Indus. Inc., 65 F.R.D. 566
(E.D. Tex. 1974) (asbestos).
232 The Bhopal litigation could be heard in one of three forums: India, the New
York Southern District Court, or the original location of each claim. If the forum
non conveniens motion is granted, Union Carbide could be subject to suit in the
Bhopal district court or before a special Indian tribunal. See infra note 253 and
accompanying text. If the motion is denied, however, Judge Keenan must decide
whether to allow the Indian Government to bring a single suit as the sole representative
of the victims, see supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text, or to remand the cases
to their original forums pursuant to the rules on multidistrict litigation. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407(a); see also supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
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awards available to the victims. 23 3 In addition, the ruling may affect
the way in which multinational corporations deal with foreign sub-
sidiaries in the future.2 14
The federal court's ruling will probably not be based on any
doctrinal standard involved in this case; as argued throughout this
Note, the applicable substantive and procedural law is notably similar
in the two forums. Rather, the true basis of the forum non conveniens
ruling in the Bhopal litigation is whether diverse cultural and social
standards in the two forums will justify a United States court in
retaining jurisdiction of these claims. Absent a showing of some
procedural or substantive unfairness to the Indian plaintiffs, the court
should grant Union Carbide's forum non conveniens motion, which
in turn would allow the victims to be adequately compensated ac-
cording to the traditional cultural standards of their home country.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens allows a United States court
to dismiss a case properly within its jurisdiction if trial in a foreign
forum would be more appropriate. 235 To be successful on a forum
233 For a discussion of the damage award differences between the two countries,
see supra notes 137-74 and accompanying text.
234 See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of the chilling
effect on American investment abroad that could result if Union Carbide is held
liable in the Bhopal litigation. See also Broad, supra note 128. At least two writers
believe that if the forum non conveniens motion is denied and the Bhopal claims
are heard in the United States, a torrent of claims would be unleashed against other
United States multinationals. Besharov & Reuter, Tort Laws Hobble U.S. Business
Abroad, Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1985, at 22, col. 2. The writers allege that American
business conducted outside the borders of the United States is at a disadvantage
since foreign-based competition is not subject to the same expensive tort liabilities.
According to this reasoning, because the United States cannot make its competitors
assume these liabilities, American investment in overseas markets will decrease as
tort judgments against United States multinationals increase. Id. As a result, the
writers advocate legislation limiting the availability of punitive damages to the same
degree that these damages would be available in the country where the injury occurred.
Id. at 22, col. 4.
233 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 84 (1971). The doctrine
of forum non conveniens probably began in Scotland in the 1830's. Case Note,
Piper v. Reyno: Change of Law and the Forum Non Conveniens Inquiry, 36 ARK.
L. REV. 273, 275 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Change of Law]. As early as 1885,
the United States Supreme Court recognized a court's right to refuse jurisdiction
over controversies between foreigners. The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355 (1885). During
the 1930's, the Supreme Court upheld application of the forum non conveniens
doctrine in certain limited situations. Change of Law, supra at 277; see also Canada
Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 285 U.S. 413 (1932) (use of the doctrine
by courts sitting in admiralty); Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123 (1933)
(doctrine used to dismiss a suit involving the internal affairs of a foreign corporation);
Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935) (state court may apply the doctrine in
appropriate circumstances). The landmark forum non conveniens case was decided
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non conveniens motion, the defendant must show great inconvenience
in the present forum 23 6 and the existence of a more appropriate forum
for the trial. 2 7 Application of the doctrine is heavily dependant on
the unique facts of the case. Whether jurisdiction should be retained
or denied is in the sole discretion of the trial judge. 238
When a forum non conveniens motion is considered in a federal
court diversity action, there is some question as to whether state
notions of forum non conveniens are binding on the court. 239 Although
the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on this issue E'2 the weight of
authority indicates that a federal court will not look to state court
rulings, but instead will rely solely on federal precedent. 24'
by the Supreme Court in 1947. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). The
most recent statement by the Supreme Court on the doctrine is found in Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). For a complete discussion of the history
of the forum non conveniens doctrine, see Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal
Forum, 60 HARv. L. REV. 908 (1947).
236 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 84 (1971); see also
Hoffman v. Goberman, 420 F.2d 423 (3d Cir. 1970).
237 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
JURISDICTION § 3828 (1976) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL PRACTICE]. The alternative
forum must have jurisdiction over all parties. Id.; see also Odita v. Elder Dempster
Lines, Ltd., 286 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
238 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 84(b) (1971). The standard
of appellate review for forum non conveniens cases was clearly enunciated by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Paper Operations Consultants Int'l, Ltd. v. S.S.
Hong Kong Amber, 513 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1975). The court stated:
An appellate court may only reverse the decision of the district court [on
a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens] if it constitutes
an abuse of discretion. It is not the role of the appellate court to determine
how it would have exercised its jurisdiction had the facts been presented
to it.
Id. at 670; see also Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 512 (applying a similar standard of whether
the lower court had exceeded its power or the bounds of its discretion).
239 FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 237, § 3828, at 181.
240 The Supreme Court refused to address the question in Koster v. Lumberman's
Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947), Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501
(1947), and in Williams v. Green Bay & W. R. Co., 326 U.S. 549 (1946).
24 See, e.g., Poe v. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co., 376 F. Supp. 1054 (D.C. Md.
1974); see also Note, Federal Procedure: Erie-Hanna Rule Held Not to Compel
Federal Application of State Internal Affairs Doctrine, 1966 DUKE L.J. 1113.
The likelihood that Union Carbide's motion for forum non conveniens will be
granted by the New York federal court would be even stronger if the federal court
looked to New York state law to decide the issue. New York courts generally deny
jurisdiction unless a 'substantial nexus' between the case and the state exists. Note,
Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi: A Novel Application of Forum Non Conveniens,
49 ALB. L. REV. 528, 546 (1985). New York courts consider not only the factors
set forth in Gilbert, but also the relevance of the facts and legal issues of the case
to the State of New York. Id. This application led the New York Court of Appeals
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The landmark decision the New York federal court will follow in
deciding the forum non conveniens issue is the Supreme Court case,
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno. 242 The Piper case involved a United
States-made plane which had crashed in Scotland killing six Scottish
citizens. The Supreme Court held that the case should be tried in
Scotland even though Scotland offered a less favorable forum for
the plaintiff's chance of recovery. 243
The New York court will also look to the private interest factor
test set forth in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert.244 Gilbert established that
federal courts have the discretion to dismiss a suit on forum non
conveniens grounds, 245 and set forth various private and public in-
terests which a court is to consider in a forum non conveniens ruling.
The private interests include: the ease of access to sources of proof;
availability of compulsory process for the attendance of unwilling
witnesses; costs involved in the attendance of willing witnesses; a
view of the premises; and the enforceability of a judgment if ob-
tained. 24 The Court further noted that the following public interests
should be considered in applying the doctrine: piling up of litigation
in congested centers; burden of jury duty being placed on those with
no relation to the litigation; deciding localized interests at home; and
to dismiss a case brought by the Government of Iran even when no alternative
forum existed in which the case could be heard. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi,
62 N.Y.2d 474, 467 N.E.2d 245, 478 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1984), cert. denied, __U.S.
__, 105 S. Ct. 783 (1985). The court noted that because the requirement of an
alternative forum was stated only as dicta in Gilbert, the court was free to hold
that availability of an alternative forum was not a prerequisite to a forum non
conveniens application. Id. at 480-81, 467 N.E.2d at 248-49, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 600-
01.
242 Piper, 454 U.S. at 235.
241 Scottish law Was considered less favorable because courts in Scotland do not
recognize strict liability, whereas American courts would have applied this doctrine
in the Piper case, allowing the plaintiffs to recover without a showing of negligence;
however, Scottish courts did recognize the doctrine of negligence. In addition,
wrongful death actions in Scotland could be brought only by the decedent's relatives
who could sue only for "loss of support and society." Id. at 240; see also Change
of Law, supra note 235, at 273-74 n.9.
I" Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 501.
241 Id. at 512. Dismissal on the basis of forum non conveniens in the Gilbert case
would be improper today because of the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982).
See FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 237, § 3828, at 178. Rule 1404(a) provides that
a case may be transferred from one federal court to another. See supra note 13
and accompanying text. Thus, the doctrine of forum non conveniens no longer
applies in the intra-federal court system. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 13, § 44, at
259-60.
24 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508.
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the possibility of applying foreign law in a United States court.247
Taken together, these factors allow a court to determine whether a
United States or a foreign forum is more convenient for the parties,
the witnesses, and the court.
In addition to considering the Gilbert factors, the Piper Court
stated that the alternative forum must offer a fair remedy. 248 The
fair remedy requirement seems to supplement Gilbert's sole require-
ment that the defendant must be amenable to process in the alternative
forum.2 49 The Piper Court did not specifically state what composes
a fair remedy, although it did hold that a showing of unfavorable
law in the alternative forum will not preclude a court from dismissing
the case on the basis of forum non conveniens; 20 however, for the
alternative forum to offer a fair remedy, the plaintiff must be able
to restate his claim in the second forum, 25 and the forum must offer
a substantive theory under which the plaintiff can recover. 252
Although a court may dismiss a case when an adequate alternative
forum is available, the dismissal carries certain conditions. The
defendant must agree to waive any statute of limitations that may
have expired while the case was under consideration in the United
States, to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign tribunal, and to
abide by any judgment rendered in the foreign tribunal. 253 Thus,
247 Id. at 508-09. For a discussion of the Gilbert factors as applied in international
litigation, see Note, The Emerging Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens: A Com-
parison of the Scottish, English and United States Applications, 18 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 111 (1985).
248 Piper, 454 U.S. at 254. The Court said, "[l]f the remedy provided by the
alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at
all, the unfavorable change in law may be given substantial weight; the district court
may conclude that dismissal would not be in the interests of justice." Id. See also
In re Air Crash Disaster Near Bombay, India on January 1, 1978, 531 F. Supp.
1175 (W.D. Wash. 1982), in which the federal court chose to retain jurisdiction of
the case, thus denying the defendant's motion for forum non conveniens largely
because experts testified that it would take Indian courts at least 10 years just to
decide whether the Indian statute of limitations could be waived by consent of the
parties. Id. at 1181.
250 Piper, 454 U.S. at 247. The Court held that "[the possibility of a change in
substantive law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight
in the forum non conveniens inquiry" (italics in original). Id.
z11 Id. at 254 n.22.
252 For an explanation of certain factors that enter into the decision of whether
an alternative forum is adequate, see Forum Shopping, supra note 16, at 59-65.
253 Robertson, supra note 125, at 271. One plaintiff's lawyer stated that Union
Carbide may have been unwise in seeking an Indian forum because, although the
American legal system is familiar to the defendants, Union Carbide is unaware of
what procedures India will implement to handle the Bhopal litigation. This lawyer
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certain factors which would render an alternative forum inadequate
can be waived by the defendant upon dismissal from the United States
court.
Union Carbide has filed its motion for forum non conveniens in
the New York federal court based on the belief that India's cultural
standards dictate that damage awards will be substantially lower in
that country. The plaintiffs have opposed the motion alleging that
the lower damage awards render India an inadequate forum. Recog-
nizing that the forum non conveniens ruling will have an impact on
the damage awards in the case, the public and private interest factors
of Gilbert are now considered in light of their application to the
facts of the Bhopal litigation.
A. Private Interests
The analysis of a forum non conveniens ruling should begin with
the private interest factors set forth in Gilbert.25 4 Private interests are
those which address convenience of the parties before the court.215
Although the plaintiff's choice of forum is given less weight when
the plaintiff is foreign, 25 6 the standard of Gilbert remains that "unless
the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice
of forum should rarely be disturbed. '257
1. Access to Proof
The Supreme Court found that access to sources of proof in the
Piper case pointed to both forums. 58 The American forum provided
was implying that India may grant even larger awards in a judgment than would
an American jury. Riley, Bhopal Victims' Attorneys Gird for First Hearing, Nat'l
L.J., Feb. 25, 1985, at 9, col. 2.
"I In Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 509, the Court considered the private interests before
the public interests. See also Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775 (D.C.
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981), in which the court set forth a four-
step process in deciding a forum non conveniens dismissal. Following a determination
that the alternative forum is adequate and has jurisdiction over the case, the private
interests are weighed. If the balance is not strongly in favor of either party following
consideration of private interests, public factors are considered. Id. at 784.
2 See Forum Shopping, supra note 16, at 50.
216 See Piper, 454 U.S. at 242, in which the Court quoted the lower court decision,
Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 479 F. Supp. 727 (M.D. Pa. 1979), stating "the courts
have been less solicitous when the plaintiff is not an American citizen or resident,
and particularly when the foreign citizens seek to benefit from the more liberal tort
rules provided for the protection of citizens and residents of the United States."
Id.
27 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508.
2 Piper, 454 U.S. at 257.
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records of the design, manufacture, and testing of the propeller and
airplane, while the Scottish forum provided evidence gathered from
the site of the accident and from witnesses in Scotland. 2 9 Thus,
evidence relating to separate theories of causation were located in
different places.
Analogously, the sources of proof in the Bhopal case also point
to the two forums. Proof to support the plaintiffs' allegations of
defective design and construction of the Bhopal plant are in the
United States. 260 Relevant evidence from witnesses to the accident,
from operation and maintenance records of the UCIL plant, and
from records of the Madhya Pradesh Government concerning reg-
ulations relating to the UCIL plant, is located in India.16 1
Although evidence of causation can be found in both forums, the
evidence concerning damages is located in India. This evidence in-
cludes medical records, testimony from doctors and nurses treating
the victims, and testimony from victims themselves. 262 Because a
substantial part of the evidence for the Bhopal litigation is located
in India, the plaintiffs may find it difficult to persuade the United
States judge to retain jurisdiction over the case based on the ease of
access to sources of proof. 26
2. Witness Availability
Witness availability is closely related to the interest in ease of access
219 Evidence dealing with strict liability could be gathered in the United States,
and evidence concerning negligence could be gathered at the Scotland accident site.
See Note, Forum Non Conveniens and Foreign Plaintiffs in the Federal Courts, 69
GEO. L.J. 1257, 1265 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Forum Non Conveniens], in which
the author states that: "courts may find forum non conveniens dismissal justified
when most of the evidence relating to a strict liability claim is located in the United
States but evidence relating to a negligence claim or to damages is more readily
available in the foreign forum" (italics in original). Id.
2 0 Adler, supra note 29, at 58.
161 The police in Bhopal seized all the records at the Bhopal plant after the accident
in preparation for an investigation into the catastrophe. Hazarika, supra note 44,
at Al, col. 3. Bud Holman, attorney for Union Carbide, has argued that broad
discovery is unnecessary because the Indian Government has already seized Union
Carbide India's documents and "knows all there is to know about the company."
Adler, supra note 29, at 61.
262 Adler, supra note 29, at 58.
263 See Byrne v. Japan Airlines, 83 Civ. 9162, slip op. at 4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17,
1984), in which the district court stated: "If access to proof is far easier in [a
foreign forum] than in the United States, dismissal of the action is appropriate."
See also Pain, 637 F.2d at 788, in which the court stated that the inability of the
parties to obtain all relevant foreign evidence would hinder a fair resolution of the
dispute.
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to sources of proof. The witness availability factor seems to weigh
heavily on the side of the defendants in this case because although
documents and written testimony could be brought from India to the
United States, Indian witnesses cannot be forced to testify in the
United States. 264
The Gilbert Court recognized the importance of having witnesses
testify at trial when it stated that to force the defendants "to try
their cases on deposition, is to create a condition not satisfactory to
the court, jury or most litigants. ' 265 Similarly, other federal courts
have considered the inability to subpoena foreign witnesses as an
important factor in deciding forum non conveniens motions.2 66
In the Bhopal case, Union Carbide argues that certain potential
defendants, such as contractors and subcontractors of the UCIL plant,
cannot be joined in the suit if the liability issue is tried in the United
States.261 Conversely, the plaintiffs have asserted that vital witnesses
such as the designers and engineers of the UCIL plant are located
in the United States. 26 In addition, attorneys for the plaintiffs have
proposed that instead of having every plaintiff flown to the United
States to testify as to damages, 269 a representative sampling of damage
trials could be held on which damage awards could be based for the
entire group of plaintiffs. 270 However, because Union Carbide is
unlikely to agree to representative damage trials, 27' and because Union
Carbide could be greatly inconvenienced without the testimony of
certain Indian witnesses substantially connected to the gas leak, the
26 See FED. R. Civ. P. 4. The Indian witnesses would not be subject to compulsory
process in the United States because under Rule 4 a witness who resides more than
100 miles from the place where the action is commenced is outside the territorial
limits of service of process. Id.
2165 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 511.
26 See, e.g., Schertenleib v. Traum, 589 F.2d 1156 (2d Cir. 1978); Fitzgerald v.
Westland Marine Corp., 369 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1966); Domingo v. States Marine
Lines, 340 F. Supp. 811 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
2167 See Adler, supra note 29, at 58.
268 Id.
269 Although the witnesses cannot be demanded to come because of Rule 4 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, they can come voluntarily. The practical problem
is that because these victims' incomes are so low, they cannot afford to fly to the
United States to testify. See id. at 28.
270 See supra note 75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the plaintiffs'
proposal for representative damage trials.
271 See Adler, supra note 29, at 62. Union Carbide attorney Bud Holman has
stated that the defendant may refuse to agree to a damage settlement based on
representative trials. Id. Holman advocated this attitude when he stated, "[w]e litigate
to the bitter end when the other side is seeking something unreasonable - that we
surrender or that we serve somebody's political purpose." Id. at 27.
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United States is not an appropriate forum under the witness avail-
ability factor.
3. Third-Party Defendants
The third private interest factor to consider involves Union Car-
bide's potential inability to implead third-party defendants. If a United
States court hears the Bhopal case, Union Carbide may be unable
to join as defendants certain responsible parties, including officials
of the Madhya Pradesh Government, 272 employers or employees of
the UCIL plant, 273 and the consulting firm responsible for the detailed
design of the plant. 274 Unless Union Carbide can join these potential
defendants in the case, the company may be forced to bring an
indemnity or contribution action in India to recover part of its losses
from these responsible parties. 275
The Piper Court also considered the inability to implead potential
third-party defendants, concluding "that the problems posed by the
inability to implead potential third-party defendants clearly supported
holding the trial in [the foreign forum]. 2 176 Consequently, the plain-
272 The purpose of joining the state government as a defendant would be to prove
the government negligent in failing to enforce safety regulations and carry out proper
inspections at the plant. See text accompanying notes 116-17. However, the state
government may not be subject to suit even if the Bhopal case is heard in the
foreign forum because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity recognized in India.
See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text. But see Bakshi, supra note 116, at
343-45, in which the author states that the modern trend in India is for the courts
to find that more and more functions of the government are considered as "non-
sovereign." thus expanding the scope of governmental liability.
273 By joining the employers and employees of the Bhopal plant, Union Carbide
would attempt to show that these potential defendants were negligent in a variety
of acts and omissions, including: (1) violating plant procedures by shutting down a
refrigeration unit designed to keep chemicals cool and inhibit violent reactions; (2)
failing to repair the leak when it was first discovered; (3) washing out a pipe
improperly sealed in violation of plant rules; Diamond, supra note 31, at Al, col.
3; (4) failing to hire trained workmen; and (5) failing to transfer MIC in the problem
tank to a spare tank as required by standard plant procedures. Id. at A6, col. I.
274 The consulting firm that provided the detailed designs for three safety devices
that failed the morning of the accident, as well as detailed designs for the overall
plant, was Humphreys & Glasgow Consultants Pvt., Ltd. of Bombay, a subsidiary
of Humphreys & Glasgow, Ltd., a consulting company based in Scotland. The
London company was purchased by the Enserch Corporation of Dallas in 1983. Id.
at A6, col. 3.
27, See Piper, 454 U.S. at 259, in which the Court stated that the defendants could
bring an action for contribution and indemnity in Scotland upon a showing that
the negligence of the pilot, the plane's owners, or the charter company contributed
to the cause of the accident. Id.
276 Id.; see also Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc., 521 F.2d 448, 453 (2d Cir. 1975) (held
that "[t]he inability to implead other parties directly involved in the controversy is
a factor which weighs against the retention of jurisdiction"). Id.
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tiffs in the Bhopal case have no competing interest which could offset
Union Carbide's inability to join additional parties. As a result, this
third private interest factor leads to the conclusion that when all of
the parties to a suit cannot be brought before the United States court,
the balance must lean toward dismissal.
4. View of the Premises
The final private interest factor in the Gilbert balancing test is
whether a view of the accident premises located in the foreign forum
would be important to the outcome of the case. In the Bhopal case,
where an inspection of the premises would be a prerequisite to de-
termining the cause of the accident, 277 the possibility of dismissal is
enhanced because the accident site is located in the foreign forum. 278
Considering this factor in Piper, the Court simply stated that the
"[t]rial would be aided by familiarity with Scottish topography, and
by east access to the wreckage. ' 279 A view of the premises weighs
even more heavily, however, in the Bhopal case. A view of the plant
and its piping system will in all likelihood be necessary to determine
how the chemical leak began. In addition, a view of the premises
will be essential to determine whether the accident could have been
caused by sabotage.
2 0
Following the private interest standards in Gilbert, the federal court
will likely decide that Union Carbide would be inconvenienced in a
United States court; however, these private interest factors by them-
selves may not conclusively mandate dismissal of the case. 28 ' There-
"' As late as December 2, 1985, the chief investigator for the Indian Central
Bureau of Investigation stated that: "[n]o one on the face of this earth knows for
certain what [caused the accident]." Weisman, supra note 8, at A10, col. 1.
278 The plant, as well as all of the safety mechanisms that reportedly failed to
control the leak, are located in Bhopal. Inside the plant, which has been closed
since the accident, 13 tons of residue from the chemical reaction await disposal. Id.
219 Piper, 454 U.S. at 242.
280 Union Carbide has alleged that the accident may have been caused by a group
of Sikh extremists known as "Black June." Adler, supra note 29, at 59. However,
Union Carbide has not yet provided any evidence supporting a claim of sabotage
beyond a single newspaper article in which the terrorist group assumed responsibility
for the Bhopal disaster. Id. Nevertheless, senior Carbide officials also subscribe to
the theory that the UCIL plant was sabotaged. See Weisman, supra note 8, at A10,
col. 2. Union Carbide's chairman Warren Anderson, however, has told a congres-
sional subcommittee that there is "no evidence whatsoever that sabotage was behind
the incident at Bhopal." Diamond, supra note 29, at D3, col. 2.
28 Although the private interest factors in Piper were sufficient for dismissal, the
Supreme Court considered the public interest factors as well. Piper, 454 U.S. at
259. Therefore, if the New York federal court finds that the private interest factors
in the Bhopal case are sufficient for dismissal, the public interest factors will probably
still be considered.
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fore, the New York federal court will also consider the following
public interest factors in relation to the Bhopal litigation.
B. Public Interests
Public interests involve the way in which legislative and judicial
policy considerations influence the administration of courts in the
present forum. 28 2 The administration of courts in turn determines
whether the home forum will accept responsibility for hearing a case. 213
As a result, the public interest factors focus on the convenience of
the court in hearing the case rather than on the convenience of the
parties before the court.
Originally, courts considered the residence of the parties to be an
important public interest factor. 214 A forum non conveniens motion
usually could be defeated if one of the parties resided within the
court's jurisdiction while, on the other hand, cases were often dismissed
if neither party resided in the district in which the suit was being
heard. 285 However, citizenship is no longer a controlling factor in the
forum non conveniens balancing test. 2 6 Indeed, the Gilbert Court
made no mention of citizenship as a controlling public interest factor
in the balancing test it set forth. 27 Therefore, the New York court
will not give great weight to the fact that each plaintiff in the Bhopal
litigation is Indian. 28 8
2 See Forum Shopping, supra note 16, at 50.
In Piper, 454 U.S. at 261, after determining that the lower court should have
granted the forum non conveniens motion, Justice Marshall, writing for the majority,
stated that: "[t]he American interest in this accident is simply not sufficient to
justify the enormous commitment of judicial time and resources that would inevitably
be required if the case were to be tried here." Id.
284 FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 237, § 3828, at 251.
285 Id.
286 Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 259, at 1270; see also Note, Forum Non
Conveniens and American Plaintiffs in the Federal Courts, 47 U. Cm. L. REV. 373,
393 (1980) [hereinafter cited as American Plaintiffs]. The author states that: "[t]he
legislative history of [the Constitution's grant of jurisdiction] indicates that it was
designed to protect the foreigner from the biases of the state courts rather than to
protect the American citizen from the biases of foreign courts." Id. at 391.
287 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09.
288 See American Plaintiffs, supra note 286, at 393. "Until recently, the federal
courts have been unanimous in holding that a defendant has a far greater burden
if dismissal will result in sending an American plaintiff suing in his own right abroad
to litigate his claim." Id. at 379. One theory suggests that a larger burden rested
on the defendant when the plaintiff was an American citizen rather than a foreign
citizen for two reasons: (1) the premise that American citizens deserve greater
protection than aliens in forum non conveniens matters; and (2) the premise that
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1. Administrative Considerations
The first public interest factor set forth in Gilbert was the backlog
of litigation in congested centers. 89 When this factor is applied to
the Bhopal case, two considerations arise. First, the case would not
cause congestion in American courts as to the resolution of liability.
Indeed, the issue of liability as concerning every claimant could be
settled in one trial; 90 however, if every plaintiff must bring his own
damage suit in the United States, 91 the possibility of significant
congestion in American courts would increase exponentially.2 92 Fur-
thermore, the language barrier between the Indian plaintiffs and the
English-speaking courts and juries would strain American courts.293
As a result of this language barrier, documents and testimonies would
require complete translation before each suit could be heard.
In addition to the problem of congestion in United States courts,
the costs of having the parties, witnesses, and hospital records flown
to the United States would be enormous. 294 Although the liability
issue could probably be tried without great expense in New York,2 95
the damage trials would require medical and hospital records, medical
foreign courts, as a class, are sufficiently likely to be deficient as to justify an
absolute or qualified presumption against them. Id. at 385.Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508.
290 See Riley, supra note 72, at 11, col. 2.
29, Union Carbide attorney Bud Holman was quoted as saying, "[wie can litigate
100,000 or 200,000 [separate damage trials] if we want to . . . If we're going to
defend ourselves - and we are - if there are 200,000 claimants, the 200,000
claimants are going to have to appear in court . . . . We think it's obvious they
should appear in an Indian court, not a U.S. court." Adler, supra note 29, at 62.
The potential problem of thousands of damage trials in the United States could be
solved if the New York federal court decided to hear the Indian Government's single
suit as sole representative of all the victims; see supra notes 59-61 and accompanying
text.
292 Congestion would especially be heavy in those states in which jurisdiction over
Union Carbide has already been established; see supra note 184 and accompanying
text. The problem of separate liability and damage trials parallels the criticisms
raised when mass tort cases are brought as class actions; see supra notes 228-31 and
accompanying text.
293 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Union Carbide Corporation's Motion
to Dismiss These Actions on the Grounds of Forum Non Conveniens, In re Union
Carbide Corporation Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December, 1984, MDL
No. 626 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1985) [hereinafter referred to as Memorandum]. India
has at least 15 major languages and hundreds of regional dialects. Memorandum,
supra at 43.
129 See Lewin, supra note 90, at 10, col. 3.
293 In the trial on the liability issue, all the victims would not be required to
testify, and much of the documentary evidence in India, such as medical records,
would not be needed.
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testimony, testimony from each victim as to personal injuries, and
testimony from witnesses to the accident. 29 Thus, the costs of pro-
ducing evidence for the damage trials alone could prohibit successful
disposition of the litigation in the United States.
Consequently, administrative considerations also pose a problem
in India. Although the language problem and the cost of transporting
evidence and witnesses is greatly reduced, the congestion in the Indian
courts presents a substantial obstacle to hearing the claims in India.2 97
With such a large backlog of cases, India may not provide an adequate
alternative forum. Perhaps the ultimate solution would be to try the
liability issue in New York and allow a special panel of judges in
India to hear all damage claims arising from the accident. 298 This
special panel would hear only claims related to the gas leak, thus
bypassing the backlog problem in Indian courts. 299
2. Choice of Law
The second public interest factor in the balancing test concerns the
possibility that an American court would be forced to apply foreign
law. When the Gilbert Court considered this interest, it held that the
need to apply foreign law points toward dismissal.3 °° Similarly, other
federal courts have held that the consideration of applying foreign
' Adler, supra note 29, at 58.
297 See Stewart, supra note 40, at 1, col. I, which states that a backlog of one
million cases exists, and this backlog may drag unresolved into the 1990's. In 1984
the Supreme Court of India had a backlog of 86,733 cases. Diamond, supra note
29, at D3, col. 2. In addition, Indian courts reportedly handle only a small number
of personal injury cases, most of which involve motor vehicle accidents. The average
decision on these verdicts comes 17.5 years after the event. Id.
298 Diamond, supra note 66, at 43, col. 5. Michael Nussbaum, a specialist in
international law, has suggested that, although India has less expertise in mass tort
litigation, it could egtablish a special tribunal of judges to hear the Bhopal cases.
Id. In Bhopal, Judge Yadan has already requested from the state government that
15 judges be assigned to hear the cases; however, no response has been forthcoming.
Victims, supra note 37, at 130.
2w See Victims, supra note 37, at 130.
100 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 511-12. For a discussion of the application of foreign law
in United States courts, see Baade, Proving Foreign and International Law in
Domestic Tribunals, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 619 (1978); Merryman, Foreign Law as a
Problem, 19 STAN. J. INT'L L. 151 (1983); Saltzburg, Discovering and Applying
Foreign and International Law in Domestic Tribunals, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 609 (1978);
Sass, Foreign Law in Federal Courts, 29 AM. J. Comp. L. 97 (1981); Sprankling &
Lanyi, Pleading and Proof of Foreign Law in American Courts, 19 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 3 (1983); Yates, Foreign Law Before Domestic Tribunals, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 725
(1978).
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law in a case is an important public interest factor favoring dis-
missal.3 0'
In the Bhopal litigation, Indian law will likely apply regardless of
the forum.30 2 Although Indian damages law may be less favorable to
the plaintiffs, 03 to overcome dismissal the plaintiffs must show that
"the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate
or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all." 3 °4 It is highly unlikely,
however, that the plaintiffs will be able to overcome dismissal by
showing that Indian law offers no remedy at all. Clearly, the doctrinal
standards of Indian law would allow complete recovery for each
victim. Moreover, any difference in the amount of awards between
an Indian and an American forum can be explained on grounds of
social and cultural standards, rather than on the basis of legal doc-
trine.
Furthermore, because both Indian and United States courts will
apply Indian law, India is the logical forum to hear the case. Pres-
umpitively, Indian courts are better able to apply the doctrines, stand-
ards, and values of Indian law. Recognizing that India's doctrinal
standards will allow adequate recovery, and that Indian law will no
doubt be applied in the case, India would provide the most appropriate
forum for the Bhopal litigation.
3. Unfairness to the State's Own Citizens
The third public interest factor involves forcing the people of a
community to bear the burden of extensive litigation when those
citizens have no related interest in the litigation. 0 5 The burden imposed
upon American juries hearing the Bhopal litigation would be felt in
two ways. The first factor, expenses of administering the case,3°6
would be felt in taxpayers' money being used to pay for the juries
and other factors necessary for processing the claims. The second
See, e.g., Calavo Growers of Cal. v. Beig., 632 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1084 (1981); Schertenleib, 589 F.2d at 1156; Farmanfarmaian v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1978).
1,,2 For a discussion of the choice of law in an American court, see supra notes
179-94 and accompanying text.
103 India's damage law may be less favorable because India does not recognize
punitive damages. For a discussion of the damage award system in India, see supra
notes 137-57 and accompanying text.
Piper, 454 U.S. at 254.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09.
', Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens In Anglo-American Law, 29
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 (1929).
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consideration is found in the delays of justice caused by the filing
of thousands of Bhopal-related suits. 07 Forcing over-burdened Amer-
ican courts to hear these claims would postpone thousands of civil
and criminal suits involving United States citizens. 08 Thus, the sig-
nificant inconvenience that would come to American citizens by the
imposition of the Bhopal litigation also weighs in favor of dismissal.
4. Indian Interests
The final factor considers which forum has the more substantial
interest in hearing the case. This factor was set forth in Gilbert when
the Court stated, "[iln cases which touch the affairs of many persons,
there is reason for holding the trial in their view and reach." 3°9 In
addition, the Supreme Court considered this localized interest factor
in Piper and determined that the strong Scottish interests present
favored a dismissal based on forum non conveniens 10
Consideration of the Bhopal facts leaves little doubt that the case
carries substantial Indian interests."' All plaintiffs are Indian, and
the Indian state government of Madhya Pradesh regulated the plant.', 2
As in the Bhopal case, when interests of the plaintiffs' forum so
clearly outweigh interests of the defendant's forum, the case should
be moved to the plaintiffs' forum for final resolution.3 3
707 Id.
3o8 Speiser, A Solution to the Bhopal Dilemma, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 3, 1986, at 13,
col. 1. The author suggests that a solution to the problems of congestion in American
courts and meager compensation in Indian courts would be for the New York district
court judge to grant Union Carbide's motion for forum non conveniens on the
condition that Union Carbide agree to binding arbitration leading to just compen-
sation for all those injured. Id.
- Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 509. The Court also stated that: "[tihere is a local interest
in having localized controversies decided at home." Id.
10 Piper, 454 U.S. at 260. The Scottish interests included: (1) the site of the
accident; (2) all of the decedents were from Scotland; and (3) all potential plaintiffs
and defendants, except for Piper and Hartzell (manufacturer of the plane and
propeller, respectively), were Scottish or English. See also Dahl v. United Technologies
Corp., 632 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1980) (court held that a dismissal should be granted
in a case where four Norwegian citizens were killed in a helicopter crash in the
North Sea, and that Norway's interest in applying its own laws equaled or exceeded
the interest of the United States). Id. at 1032-33.
See Memorandum, supra note 293, at 37-41.
3,2 Reinhold, supra note 5, at Al, col. 6. The UCIL plant was theoretically
monitored by the state government of Madhya Pradesh under four main national
laws: the Factories Act of 1948, the Insecticides Act of 1968, the Water Act of
1974, and the Air Act of 1982. Much blame for the accident has been placed on
the Madhya Pradesh labor department, which enforces the Factories Act; however,
the Act is "aimed mainly at providing safe working conditions for plant workers,
rather than protecting the general public." Id. at A8, col. 4.
- The question might be raised whether the Indian Government can waive its
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Strict application of the Gilbert balancing test under the Bhopal
facts results in the conclusion that Union Carbide's forum non con-
veniens motion should be granted. The Indian interests in this case
are substantial, and federal courts in the United States have generally
declined jurisdiction in cases brought by foreign plaintiffs when the
foreign forum had a particularly strong interest in hearing the case.3' 4
In addition, Union Carbide's great inconvenience in litigating the
damage claims in the United States favors a dismissal based on forum
non conveniens.
V. CONCLUSION
The MIC gas leak at the UCIL Bhopal plant was one of the worst
industrial accidents of all time. Certainly, just compensation should
be paid by the party or parties at fault. One question that remains
unresolved is which party is at fault-the UCIL plant, the Union
Carbide parent company, the Indian Government, or some combi-
nation of the three. Regardless of the identity of the party at fault,
however, the compensation should be distributed through the Indian
legal system.
The substantial Indian interests in the case and the likelihood that
Indian law will apply regardless of the forum support the conclusion
that the Bhopal litigation should be tried in India. The appropriateness
of an Indian forum is underscored by the fact that all the plaintiffs
reside in Bhopal, the accident occurred within India's borders, and
much of the necessary evidence is located in that country. Moreover,
Indian judges are better able to apply not only the legal theories of
Indian law, but also the standards and values inherent in their own
body of law.
The substantive body of tort law existing in India is doctrinally
very similar to United States tort law. Although India has not yet
applied strict liability in a mass tort suit, sufficient precedent exists
whereby an Indian court could apply this theory to the Bhopal case.
Moreover, because filing fees have been waived, the Bhopal claimants
have ready access to Indian courts.
The major distinction between the Indian and American legal sys-
interests in the case in an effort to persuade Judge Keenan that the United States
is the proper forum for the Bhopal litigation. However, even if the Indian Government
does waive its interests in the case, the other private and public Gilbert factors weigh
heavily in support of dismissal, see supra notes 254-312 and accompanying text.
3,4 See, e.g., In re Disaster at Riyadh Airport, Saudi Arabia, on August 19, 1980,
540 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1982); Harrison v. Wyeth Laboratories, Etc., 510 F.
Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd without op., 676 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1982).
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tems, therefore, is the standard of damages traditionally awarded in
tort cases. American tort judgments tend to be high as a result of
the value which juries place on human life. Further, the level of
income enjoyed by the average American greatly exceeds the average
income earned in other countries, including India. Finally, punitive
damages are available in certain tort cases. Many American states
allow punitive damages, but at least four states have, like India,
refused to recognize them.
The distinction in damage awards, therefore, should be explained
in terms of the cultural and social standards of the two countries
and not in terms of doctrinal differences. The Indian victims can
fairly and justly be compensated in their own country according to
the cultural standards that ordinarily affect their everyday lives. India
has standards of living, wealth, values, and beliefs that are vastly
different from those in the United States.3" In addition, India is
faced with distinctly different needs, problems, and resources,3 1 6 and
has adopted a system of tort compensation which is uniquely designed
to meet the needs, solve the problems, and handle the resources of
that country. As a result, fairness to both the plaintiffs and defendants
in the Bhopal litigation mandates that these claims be brought in
India,3 1 7 and that justice be done according to the legal doctrines and
cultural standards of that country." 8
Stephen L. Cummings
See Wyeth, 510 F. Supp at 4.
6 d.
1" Id. at 5, where the court stated that: "fairness to the defendant mandates that
defendant's conduct be judged by the standards of the community affected by its
actions" (emphasis in original).
I'm Non Causus Belli, supra note 157, at 30, col. 2. The author states:
Justice can be done in Indian courts. India is not Ruritania. The British
left behind a perfectly good legal system - better, in fact, than the U.S.
system because contingency fees are outlawed so that only the injured
benefit. If Union Carbide was negligent, Indian courts will make sure the
company compensates the victims.
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